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Abstract
This thesis discusses how local forces, despite being the weaker actor in a proxy
relationship, manipulate external powers’ support to pursue their own objectives. Three
factors – practical advantage, relative will, and diverging objectives – explain this
counterintuitive power dynamic. First, local forces have better local knowledge, more
extensive networks, and greater legitimacy, which give them leverage and make them
desirable partners. Second, local forces' involvement is often existential rather than selective;
unlike external powers, local forces are thus unconstrained by domestic political
vulnerabilities. This enables them to close the significant power gap with external powers.
Third, local forces' objectives may diverge from their sponsors', creating incentives for
exploitation and manipulation of external support to pursue their own agenda, regardless of
the external powers’ interests. These three factors effectively explain the dynamic between
the Soviet Union and Cuba during the Angolan civil war and the relationship between the U.S.
and the Kurds in the fight against ISIS. Cuba mostly operated within the Soviet strategic
parameters, while at the same time manipulating Soviet support to forward its own interests
in Africa. The Kurds manipulated U.S. support while fighting ISIS to acquire territories and
to pursue autonomy and independence, goals inconsistent with US interests. Further
research is still needed to identify under what conditions local partners will wield this
counterintuitive power, since there also are cases in which this does not take place.
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Chapter 1: A Re-telling of the David and Goliath Story
The story about how David defeated Goliath, the giant, by throwing a stone at Goliath’s
weak spot on his head, has been frequently used by scholars to demonstrate how the weak
defeat the strong. This paper, however, focuses on another intriguing question that also
concerns the dynamic between the weak and the strong in the international system. In order to
better illustrate the question, it is useful to apply the setting of David and Goliath to a new
storyline. Instead of David challenging Goliath, David would be fighting one of his own kind.
The conflict would then catch Goliath’s attention and lure him to intervene through
supporting David. Despite Goliath’s power advantage in this relationship, he could not fully
control David. In fact, Goliath is sometimes even susceptible to David’s manipulation.
What happens in this story describes the relationship between external powers and local
forces in a variety of intervention cases. Through supporting and relying on local forces, the
external power intends to intervene and achieve certain objectives in the local sphere without
deploying its own armed forces.1 John Mearsheimer defines such strategy as offshore
balancing.2 Mearsheimer is a strong advocate for offshore balancing and perceives it as the
best strategy to prevent the emergence of a regional hegemon at a relatively low cost, to
counter the rise of terrorism, and to control nuclear proliferation. 3 Richard Nixon made a
similar argument in his famous “silent majority” speech about the Vietnam war in November
1969, in which he introduced a strategy shift from “Americanization” to “Vietnamization.” 4
Instead of the U.S. taking the lead to fight the war, Nixon wanted the South Vietnamese army
to take control over the conflict. 5 The U.S. would start to withdraw forces from Vietnam but

1

John J. Mearsheimer, "Imperial by Design." The National Interest, no. 111 (2011): 18,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/42897726.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid., 31-33.
4
"Vietnamization," Miller Center, October 11, 2017, https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/educationalresources/vietnamization.
5
"Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam - November 3, 1969 » Richard Nixon Foundation," Richard
Nixon Foundation, January 19, 2018, https://www.nixonfoundation.org/2017/09/address-nation-war-vietnamnovember-3-1969/.
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increase the provision of training and equipment for the South Vietnamese army.6 Nixon said
in his speech that this strategy was inspired by the words of a leader of another Asian country,
who said “when you are trying to assist another nation defend its freedom, U.S. policy should
be to help them fight the war but not to fight the war for them.”7 The incentive to increase
support for the South Vietnamese army was that the U.S. could withdraw faster and sooner as
South Vietnam became stronger. 8
While, in theory, Mearsheimer’s offshore balancing and Nixon’s Vietnamization are
designed in a way that enables external powers to effectively achieve their objectives, in
reality, it is not always the case. As we have described in the modified version of the David
and Goliath story, there is no guarantee that the external power has complete control over
local forces, whom it intends to use to achieve its objectives. In fact, the local forces, though
being the weaker actor in the partnership, could even manage to manipulate external support
to forward their own interests. This paper intends to explain why and how this rather
counterintuitive dynamic could happen.

6

Ibid.
Ibid.
8
Ibid.
7
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Chapter 2: The Theory Chapter
This chapter builds a theoretical foundation for this paper and argues that local forces
can manipulate external powers in cases of intervention mainly due to three reasons. First,
local forces have practical advantages over external powers, in terms of more extensive local
presence, better knowledge and deeper understanding of the local politics, economy, and
society, well-established local networks and higher legitimacy in the local sphere. Second, an
internal conflict can pose an imminent threat to the survival of local forces but not to that of
the external powers. 9 The different levels of stakes involved would shape the actors’ relative
will to fight and subject them to various levels of political vulnerability. 10 Local forces would
be fighting for survival, which results in strong resolve to fight and few controversies over
the necessity of fighting. 11 External powers, however, would only be fighting for geopolitical
interests, which requires a swift victory to justify the purpose of intervention and the
allocation of resources.12 Third, it is almost impossible for the objectives of external powers
and local forces to be perfectly aligned. The relationship between the two actors then faces
the problem of agency slack. 13 If the local forces’ objectives significantly diverge from those
of the external powers, they would have strong incentives to manipulate the external support
to pursue their own objectives, which could actually contradict the external powers’
interests.14 These three factors will be discussed in more detail and then applied to specific
cases in the following chapters.
Compared to the external power, local forces are not only better informed about local
politics, economy and society but also better connected with the local community. The

9

Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," Power, Strategy
and Security, 1983, 132, doi:10.1515/9781400886326-008.
10
Ivan Arreguín-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars," International Security, 2001, 96,
doi:10.1017/cbo9780511521645.
11
Mack, 132.
12
Ibid.
13
Idean Salehyan, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and David E. Cunningham, "Explaining External Support for
Insurgent Groups," International Organization 65, no. 04 (2011): 714, doi:10.1017/s0020818311000233.
14
Ibid.
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possession of these crucial resources gives the local forces a practical advantage over the
external power. Philipp Münch and Alex Veit argue that the access to a range of “decisive
resources like information, protection or community support” makes local actors “necessary
for external actors to achieve certain ends in the local sphere.” 15 Local actors in possession of
these resources that help external actors achieve their goals are defined as intermediaries. 16
Münch and Veit also point out that external power has relied on intermediaries to project and
retain power in the local sphere since the era of colonization. 17 During colonization, colonial
intermediaries, including chiefs, soldiers, and translators, facilitated the colonial power to
rule at a relatively low cost and helped sustain the long-distance ruling.18 In contemporary
efforts of peacebuilding or nation building, external powers have continued to partner with
local forces both to create a sense of “efficiency and sustainability” in the minds of the
western audience and to reduce costs that would otherwise be necessary to either contain the
conflict or govern the territory and population. 19 Similar to Münch and Veit’s arguments,
Idean Salehyan, Kristian Gleditsch, and David Cunningham also argue that among many
reasons why external powers support local forces, local advantage, including more legitimacy,
better information sources, and less pushback from the community, has always been
important in the external actor’s calculations. 20
While scholars mentioned above argue that local forces’ practical advantage over local
resources makes them desirable partners for external powers, Jennifer Taw makes a similar
argument but from a different perspective by arguing that without a thorough understanding
of the local power dynamic, all foreign policies, including intervention, could only achieve a

15

Philipp Münch and Alex Veit, "Intermediaries of Intervention: How Local Power Brokers Shape External
Peace- and State-Building in Afghanistan and Congo," International Peacekeeping 25, no. 2 (2017): 270,
doi:10.1080/13533312.2017.1411808.
16
Ibid., 267.
17
Ibid., 270.
18
Ibid.
19
Ibid.
20
Salehyan et al, 714.
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filtered effect in the target country. 21 Taw argues that “no foreign policy, regardless of intent,
is immune to the effects of internal politics; a policy’s success will depend to at least some
extent – and sometimes entirely – on how the many actors within the country at which it is
directed respond.”22 Policies that ignore the effect of the dynamic in the target state could
easily result in a “distributive domestic response,” which means that the intended outcome of
a foreign policy is filtered through the response of local actors competing for power and
influence.23 Local actors can influence the policy outcome through actions that “slow, block
or pervert” the implementation of policies regardless of their objectives. 24 The extent and
under what circumstances that the distributive domestic response would filter the intended
outcome of a policy depend on three factors: the types of political system, the level of
stability and the number of actors in the target state. 25 According to Taw’s model that focuses
on these three factors, the policy-producing state would have the least control over the
outcome of its foreign policy when the policy is implemented in a failed state, where the
widespread instability can create abundant opportunities for the external power to upset the
“relative balance of power among domestic actors” and the large number of actors present in
the failed state can further complicate the task of distinguishing which actors are influencing
the policy outcome in what ways. 26 The instability and power vacuum in failed states tend to
lure external powers to intervene and project power. 27 What comes with these opportunities
of exploitation, however, are local complexities and challenges, as a result of the lack of
central authority and the large number of actors. These will intensely filter the external
powers’ policy outcome. 28 In other words, if the distributive domestic response is not
21

Jennifer Morrison Taw, "Distributive Domestic Response," Review of International Studies 37, no. 03
(August 26, 2010): 1359, doi:10.1017/s0260210510000926.
22
Ibid.
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid., 1360-1363.
26
Ibid., 1361.
27
Ibid.
28
Ibid., 1363.
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understood, it cannot be mitigated or compensated, which makes it more likely for “internal
power politics to trump international power politics.” 29
In the case of an intervention, the intended outcome is for the local forces to stay under
the external powers’ control and utilize resources effectively to fulfill the external powers’
objectives. If the external powers have insufficient knowledge about the local politics and
society, they may intervene blindly, which creates opportunities for the local actors to use
their practical advantage to manipulate the resources provided by the external actors to
forward their own interests. 30 In addition, Münch and Veit also argue that external powers
tend to favor local actors that are not only more competent, in terms of intelligence and
resources, but also more well connected in the society. 31 Although more competent local
actors are more likely to deliver the desirable outcome, they are also more capable and
mindful of protecting their own positions, and therefore, less dependent on external support
and more difficult to control. 32
The second reason that local forces can manipulate external powers despite power
disadvantage is about the relative will to fight. Ivan Arreguín-Toft and Andrew Mack’s
discussion on how weak actors defeat strong actors in asymmetric conflicts can provide
important insights into this argument. 33 When the power disparity between the strong and the
weak in a conflict is significant, the conflict is described as asymmetric. 34 Arreguín-Toft
coded a conflict asymmetric when the strong actor’s power, which is comprised of armed
forces and population, is greater than or equal to five times the weak actor’s power. 35 Mack
describes the asymmetric relationship as “a function of the differences in level of industrial

29

Ibid., 1381.
Ibid., 1364-1370.
31
Münch and Veit, 270.
32
Ibid.
33
Arreguín-Toft and Mack.
34
Arreguín-Toft, 96.
35
Ibid.
30
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and technological capability of the two sides” and defines it as a “resource asymmetry.” 36
While it is intuitive to assume that power assures victory, and consequently, strong actors
should almost always win, statistics and historical evidence show exceptions. Weak actors
won around 30 percent of asymmetric conflicts between 1800 and 1998, and the percentage
of the number of conflicts won by weaker actors has increased over time.37 Examples in
which weaker actors win wars include the first Indochina War, the Vietnam War, and the
Algerian War.38 To explain this rather counterintuitive outcome of these asymmetric wars,
Mack and Arreguín-Toft have each proposed an argument.
Mack argues that the significant power disparity makes the conflict outcome more
salient to the weak than to the strong, which results in an interest asymmetry and a difference
in the level of political vulnerability. 39 For the strong actor, its overall power advantage
guarantees its homeland security because, according to Mack, the weak actor does not have
sufficient capability to launch an invasion. 40 For the weak actor, however, the strong
opponent can invade and even occupy its territory, which threatens its survival. 41 While the
weak actor’s interest in the conflict is about survival, the strong actor’s interest depends on
the conflict’s “proximity to major power centers and intense conflict zones, and the risks it
poses both regionally and globally.” 42 Similar to Mack, David Carment and Dane Rowlands
also argue that the salience of the conflict to an actor is “largely exogenous and at best only
marginally sensitive to policy choices or manipulation.” 43 In other words, even if
policymakers intend to manipulate perceptions, the salience of a conflict is derived from “a

36

Mack, 133.
Arreguín-Toft, 97.
38
Ibid., 118.
39
Mack, 130.
40
Ibid., 128.
41
Ibid., 132.
42
David Carment and Dane Rowlands, "Three’s Company: Evaluating Third-Party Intervention in Intrastate
Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution 42, no. 5 (October 1998): 579, doi:10.1177/0022002798042005003.
43
Ibid.
37
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geostrategic context,” which should be widely known and stable in the short-term.44 If the
conflict is widely known to be of relatively low salience to the actor, the strong actor’s
involvement lacks political credibility. 45 In general, Mack argues that the weak fight a “total”
war whereas the strong only fight a “limited” war. 46
Due to the asymmetry in salience and interest, the two actors would adopt different
methods and attitudes toward the war. The weak actor would perceive the war as a total war
of survival, which then justifies the mobilization of all armed forces, population and
resources.47 Such an imminent threat would also provoke a strong sense of nationalism and
unite the previously divided or even hostile domestic groups to fight against the common
enemy.48 The strong actor, however, would face a limited war, which makes a full-scale
mobilization and deployment politically impossible and unnecessary. 49 Constituents would be
more concerned about the opportunity cost of the resources allocated for the war when it is
not an issue of survival. More importantly, given the significant power disparity, the strong
actor would expect to achieve its objectives with limited commitments in a short period of
time.50 If this were not the case, and the expected outcome were continuously delayed while
the strong actor kept on building up its efforts, the strong actor would face a range of
criticisms and doubts from domestic political and social institutions questioning whether to
continue engaging in the war. 51 Facing these domestic controversies, the strong actor can
either increase forces, which would generate more costs and the victory is not guaranteed, or
withdraw, which may risk looking incompetent and damage its credibility.52 Mack points out
that strong democratic actors are more vulnerable to domestic constraints because, unlike
44

Ibid.
Ibid., 580.
46
Mack, 132.
47
Ibid.
48
Ibid., 133.
49
Ibid., 132.
50
Arreguín-Toft, 105.
51
Ibid.
52
Ibid.
45
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totalitarian states, a democracy cannot censor the media or block information. 53 Although
democracies would face more pressure from domestic checks and balances, the media, and
the public, totalitarian states can also be forced to analyze the costs and benefits of the war
when ruling elites’ interests are threatened. 54
Arreguín-Toft mostly agrees with Mack that relative interests explain strong actors’
domestic political vulnerability, yet he points out that Mack’s argument is the “weakest when
explaining actor interests as a function of relative power, and strongest when explaining
strong-actor failure as a consequence of political vulnerability.”55 Arreguín-Toft challenges
the connection between relative power and relative interest by arguing that although the
outcome of one distant war does not pose any threat to the strong actor’s survival, a defeat in
an asymmetric conflict may be perceived as a signal of weakness and incompetence that
would threaten its leading position. 56 If the perception of a one-time defeat is “intensified by
domino logic,” the strong actor might panic about the effect of cumulative loss on its
survival.57 Additionally, Arreguín-Toft argues that the strong actor’s resolve to win the war
would drastically increase after it enters the war even if its interests are initially peripheral. 58
In sum, the power disparity does not always result in an interest asymmetry. 59 When the
conflict is perceived as being more important, the strong actor would face fewer political
constraints that would otherwise weaken the actor’s will to fight. 60 Since Mack’s interest
asymmetry argument seems to have oversimplified the problem, Arreguín-Toft introduces
strategic interaction to refine Mack’s theory and to better explain “the conditions under which
political vulnerability causes strong actors to lose asymmetric wars.” 61
53

Mack, 143.
Ibid., 143-144.
55
Arreguín-Toft, 99.
56
Ibid., 98.
57
Ibid.
58
Ibid.
59
Ibid.
60
Ibid.
61
Ibid., 99.
54
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Arreguín-Toft’s strategic interaction theory argues that weak actors are more likely to
win asymmetric wars through opposite-approach interactions. 62 He separates attack and
defense strategies into direct attack/defense and indirect attack/defense, in which direct
approaches target the enemy’s capacity to fight whereas indirect approaches aim at the
enemy’s will to fight. 63 When the two actors interact using same approach (direct-direct,
indirect-indirect), the situation favors the strong because the relative material power
advantage enables it to target the weak actor’s army and defeat it quickly.64 On the other hand,
when the two actors interact using opposite approach (direct attack-indirect defense, indirect
attack-direct defense), the weak can manage to deflect the strong actor’s power advantage
and prolong the conflict, which exposes the strong to domestic pressure.65 Statistics support
this argument: strong actors won 76% of the asymmetric wars dominated by same-approach
interactions between 1800 and 1998, while weak actors won 63% of the conflicts dominated
by opposite-approach interactions.66 To sum up, Arreguín-Toft builds his argument on top of
Mack’s theory and argues that weak actors are more likely to win asymmetric wars through
opposite-approach interactions, which effectively target and attack the strong actor’s political
vulnerability – the main reason why the strong actors pull out of a war prior to achieving their
objectives.67
To apply Mack and Arreguín-Toft’s arguments to the relationship between external
powers and local forces, we would notice that the relative will and political vulnerability
arguments are still applicable even though the local forces are not fighting the external
powers in an asymmetric war. Instead, they form an alliance against other local powers. The
local forces would still have a stronger resolve to fight because a defeat in the internal

62

Ibid., 110.
Ibid., 100-104.
64
Ibid., 112.
65
Ibid.
66
Ibid.
67
Ibid., 97.
63
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conflict can pose an imminent threat to their survival. The security of the external powers’
territories and populations, however, are not under threat. While the power disparity does
reflect the external powers’ better military and technological capability, their limited interests
and high expectations also make them more politically vulnerable. Just as Mack and
Arreguín-Toft argued, the external powers would face pressure from their domestic political
system demanding a quick victory to justify the resources and personnel allocated for the
intervention. When it becomes obvious that the intervention faces significant doubts from the
intervening country, the local forces would not expect a long-term relationship, and therefore,
would not mind sabotaging the relationship through manipulation if given the chance. 68
Apart from the local forces’ practical advantage over local resources and their stronger
will to fight, the third factor that may lead to manipulation is the misalignment of objectives.
Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham use the principal-agent framework to explain external
support for rebel groups and argue that external support for rebel groups depends on the
calculations of both the supply side – the external power – and the demand side – the rebel
groups.69 Although the focus of Salehyan et al.’s article is on external support for rebel
groups, the principal-agent framework is also applicable and useful in explaining the
relationship between external powers and local forces, including both rebel groups and local
governments, in a broader sense. On the supply side, external powers may plan to achieve a
variety of objectives through intervention, such as to project influence on other states’
behaviors and policies, to promote certain values and ideologies, and to shape the outcome of
an internal conflict. 70 To achieve these objectives, external powers can use coercive
bargaining, including sanctions and embargo, launch an interstate war, or “delegate the

68

Carment and Rowland, 579-580.
Salehyan et al, 714.
70
Hans J. Morgenthau, "To Intervene or Not to Intervene." Foreign Affairs 45, no. 3 (1967): 427-29.
doi:10.2307/20039247.
69
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conflict to local forces.”71 Salehyan et al. argue that similar to coercion and invasion,
delegating the conflict to local forces is “a tactic that states may employ in weakening their
enemies.”72 While choosing from their toolkit of tactics, states would conduct a cost-benefit
analysis on each tactic because all choices “entail important trade-offs.” 73
Compared to an interstate war, intervention through supporting local forces provides
external powers with mainly two advantages. First, delegating the conflict to local forces
generates fewer costs, in terms of both economic resources and casualties, than starting a
war.74 While intervention might still lead to skepticisms over its necessity in the domestic
political system, it would generate far less “domestic war weariness and discontent” than
dragging a state into an open war. 75 Second, the relative secrecy of intervention protects the
external power from international condemnation and pressure.76 Since it is much more
difficult to find concrete evidence to prove the link between an external power and a local
force, the international society is less likely to react in a defensive way that challenges the
legitimacy of the external power’s presence. 77 Additionally, it is not the external powers’
soldiers on the ground, which makes it a lot easier for the external powers to distance
themselves from the local forces in cases of brutality and war crimes.78
While these advantages seem to make delegation a desirable choice, there are always
trade-offs. Different from an interstate war, where the principals – the external powers – have
full control over their objectives and the means to achieve such objectives, delegation to
agents – the local forces – can lead to “potential agency slack or loss of autonomy.”79 The
problem for agency slack would be the most severe if the local forces’ objectives and
71

Salehyan et al, 712.
Ibid.
73
Ibid., 713.
74
Ibid.
75
Ibid.
76
Ibid.
77
Ibid.
78
Ibid.
79
Ibid., 714.
72
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preferences do not align with that of the external powers.80 Salehyan et al. argue that in order
to reduce the potential for a loss of agency, external powers should choose to support forces
that have similar ethnicity, religion, language or culture.81 However, such choices are not
always available, and the alignment of objectives is not guaranteed even if the principals and
the agents share those characteristics. Besides, in a constantly changing fighting environment,
local forces’ preferences and objectives could easily change. When the problem of agency
slack happens, the external powers start to loss autonomy and control over their “foreign
policies and the conduct of the conflict.” 82 Local forces could use the resources provided by
their external sponsors to pursue their own interests that do not necessarily align with their
sponsors.83 According to Salehyan et al., the agency slack can take many forms, including
“devoting suboptimal effort to the conflict with the resources provided; engaging in
unwelcome or egregious behavior such as war crimes; diverting resources toward other,
undesired, objectives; or in some cases, using the resources supplied against the patron
itself.”84 In addition, states are more likely to choose interstate war over delegation when the
internal conflict is “absolutely critical to the vital interests of the state.” 85 As mentioned
above in the arguments of Mack, Carment, and Rowlands, the salience of the conflict affects
the relative interest of the state, which is consistent with a state’s geopolitical interests, and
consequently, widely known and not susceptible to politicians’ manipulation. 86 As a result, a
state’s decision to delegate the conflict to local forces is by itself a signal of lack of interests,
which makes it hard to convince the local forces to obey the external powers’ orders in
exchange for resources in the long run.

80

Ibid.
Ibid., 715.
82
Ibid., 714.
83
Ibid.
84
Ibid.
85
Ibid.
86
Mack, 142.
81
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On the demand side, local forces also face a trade-off in making the decision of whether
to accept support from an external power. According to Salehyan et al., local forces have two
priorities that can be in conflict with each other. First, they want to maximize resources at
their disposal to win the war. 87 As mentioned above, Salehyan et al. focus on the rebel
organizations and they point out that compared to the national government, rebel groups are
usually at a resource disadvantage. 88 To broaden the scope of this argument, almost all local
forces are at a resource disadvantage compared to external powers, which means that local
forces would always have something to gain from the external powers’ support.
Correspondingly, when the power disparity is significant, the external powers would have a
lot to offer, including “access to money, equipment, training, sanctuary, and personnel.” 89
These resources are especially valuable to local forces at the initial stage of the conflict, since
it can be hard for the local forces to “mobilize a significant military capacity” in a short
period of time.90 And a continual supply of these resources from the external powers would
still be beneficial because it would “significantly augment the resource base.” 91 The second
thing that local forces would want is to retain autonomy over their objectives and their
actions of achieving these objectives. 92 Salehyan et al. argue that the rebel groups’ objectives
could range from gaining more political power, including “greater role in the national
government or more territories,” to acquiring more economic benefits, including “personal
enrichment and material rewards.” 93 Although the resources provided by external powers are
attractive, they always “come with strings attached.” 94 The principal will want “ some degree
of control over the rebel’s agenda,” which forces the rebel groups to give up “some control

87

Salehyan et al, 715.
Ibid., 716.
89
Ibid.
90
Ibid.
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Ibid.
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Ibid., 715.
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Ibid., 716.
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Ibid.
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over their aims and tactics.” 95 Besides, relying too much on the external power also puts the
local forces at the risk of looking incompetent and losing legitimacy if the local community
perceive them as “pawns of a foreign power.” 96
Due to the tradeoff between resources and autonomy, Salehyan et al. argue that local
forces would prefer domestic support base over external patronage. 97 For stronger local
forces that have more access to domestic resources and control over tax revenues from
controlled territories, the costs of external patronage would outweigh the benefits, which
gives them fewer incentives to accept external support.98 For weaker actors that are not able
to mobilize enough funding or personnel, they would be more willing to exchange autonomy
for resources.99 However, given the embedded conflict between the local forces’ two main
objectives, they would always have incentives to fight for more autonomy when given the
chance. The incentives would be stronger if the objectives and preferences between the
external powers and local forces are severely misaligned. 100 In this case, the foreign
sponsorship would be likely to “entail unwelcome constraints” on local forces through
forcing them to act in a way that achieve the external powers’ objectives at the cost of the
local forces’ benefits.101 While local forces endure more unwelcome constraints and gain
more power through external support, they would have both the motivation and the capacity
to deflect the external control and to manipulate external resources to forward their own
interests at the expense of their external sponsors.102
To sum up this chapter, there are mainly three reasons why local actors, though at a
power disadvantage, could manipulate external sponsors’ support. First, local forces have a

95
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practical advantage, meaning better understanding of local politics and better local network,
over external powers. As demonstrated by the alliance between external powers and local
forces during colonization and state building, access to local intelligence and resources
creates strong incentives for external powers to support local actors. The other side of the
argument is that without sufficient understanding of the local politics, external powers’
foreign policy would be filtered through the power struggle among local actors and only
achieve a limited outcome. In order to achieve the intended outcome of their intervention
policy, external powers are motivated to rely on local forces for intelligence and connections,
which gives local forces power over external actors and exposes external actors to the risk of
manipulation. Besides, external powers would prefer to partner with more competent local
forces, which makes them less dependent on external support, more mindful of their own
position, and therefore, more difficult to control.
Second, compared to external powers, local forces have stronger resolve to fight and
suffer from fewer political vulnerability. Local forces have stronger resolve to fight because
they have higher stakes involved in the conflict – a defeat in the conflict can annihilate the
entire local force but pose no threat to external powers’ homeland. Due to the significant
power disparity between external powers and local forces, external powers would be more
politically vulnerable, as their constituents would expect a swift victory to justify the purpose
of intervention and the allocated resources and personnel. If external powers fail to achieve
the expected outcome efficiently, they would then face pressure and doubts from their
domestic political system, some of which would demand a termination of intervention. Once
the local forces perceive that the alliance with external powers is not a long-term relationship,
they would not put in efforts to maintain the relationship and would be tempted to sabotage it
through manipulation if given the chance.
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Third, the misalignment of objectives between external powers and local forces subjects
the relationship to the problem of agency slack. For external powers (the principal),
delegating the conflict to local actors has mainly two advantages – lower costs and more
secrecy – with a drawback of less control over their objectives and the actions of achieving
them. For local forces (the agent), the tradeoff is between accepting resources from external
sponsors and sacrificing autonomy over their own agenda, since resources mostly come with
strings attached. Given the inherent conflict between resources and autonomy in the
principal-agent framework, local forces would always have incentives to break free from
external control and to gain more autonomy. These incentives would be stronger if the
objectives of the two groups are severely misaligned. Even though external powers could
choose groups that share certain characteristics to mitigate the problem, the risk of agency
slack would still be present. Additionally, states tend to choose interstate war over delegation
when the conflict at hand is of vital interests. The decision to delegate the conflict to a local
agent is by itself a signal of a lack of resolve, which therefore, indicates a fragile alliance.
The analysis of these three factors will be applied to two cases in the following chapters.
The first case focuses on the relationship between the Soviet Union and Cuba in Angola
while the second case discusses the relationship between the U.S. and the Kurds in fighting
ISIS in Syria and Iraq.
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Chapter 3: Cuba, An International Paladin103
The conflict in Angola started in 1961 as a revolution against Portuguese colonization. 104
During the revolution, three local guerrilla forces – the Popular Movement for the Liberation
of Angola (MPLA) led by Agostinho Neto, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola
(FNLA) led by Holden Roberto, and the National Union for the Total Independence of
Angola (UNITA) led by Jonas Savimbi – fought for control over Angola. 105 Division among
these local forces was characterized by “ethnic, territorial, and language barriers,” which was
then reinforced by Portuguese colonial policies, including “press censorship, travel
restrictions, and constant police harassment,” in place to prevent joint indigenous
opposition.106 These policies significantly restricted the “ranges of action, life-spans, and
political vision” of the guerrilla forces, which made it almost impossible for their leaders to
overcome ethnic and regional boundaries to build an alliance that jointly fought for
independence.107 As a result, the Angolan local forces spent most of the time fighting each
other in the first ten years of the revolution, and therefore, had few success against the
Portuguese colonial power. 108 The situation started to change in April 1974, when the Armed
Forces Movement in the Portuguese military overthrew the Caetano dictatorship in Lisbon. 109
The left-leaning new government in Lisbon had no interest in retaining the colonies, which
were perceived as a burden and an embarrassment, and intended to gradually withdraw from
Angola.110 While Portugal's decision to withdraw removed a major obstacle for the liberation
movements, it also “set off a mad scramble for influence in Angola.” 111
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After the April 1974 coup, external powers, including China, Zaire, the U.S., the Soviet
Union, Cuba, and South Africa started to intervene through backing local forces that
supported their strategies and ideologies. 112 Through providing support, external powers
added an ideological element to the national liberation movement, exacerbated the division
among local forces, and, eventually, turned Angola into a chessboard for power struggle. 113
China and Zaire started to provide arms and technical support to both FNLA and UNITA
in the early 1960s.114 Support from China stopped during China’s Cultural Revolution (19661970), which forced FNLA to rely completely on Zaire, while UNITA had to depend on
itself.115 China resumed its support for both the FNLA and UNITA after the coup in 1974. 116
While the U.S. mostly held back from intervening in Angola in the 1960s, the U.S.
government, under pressure from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the thenSecretary of State Henry Kissinger, recognized Angola’s importance after the 1974 coup and
started to send arms and aids through Zaire to FNLA. 117 When the FNLA and UNITA
officially joined forces against the MPLA in the summer of 1975, the U.S. provided support
for the FNLA-UNITA alliance. 118 Similar to China’s relationship with the FNLA, the Soviet
aid for the MPLA went on and off during the 1960s. 119 The Soviet Union stopped providing
aid to the MPLA twice, once in 1963 and once in 1974, when the Soviets thought the MPLA
was going to lose the war. 120 By November 1974, the Soviets resumed arms shipment to the
MPLA.121 Compared to the Soviets, the Cubans were more consistent with their support for
the MPLA. Cuba sent several hundred advisers to train MPLA fighters in 1966, and some
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stayed with the guerilla forces into the 1970s.122 After the civil war broke out in March 1975,
Cuba sent in more military advisers and later armed forces to fight with the MPLA. 123 South
Africa’s intervention did not start until the eruption of the civil war. 124 In July 1975, South
Africa “engaged in parallel covert operations” with the U.S. in Angola, and then directly
intervened with military forces in October to remove the MPLA from the Angolan capital
Luanda.125
In order to achieve a smooth and orderly withdrawal from Angola, the new Portuguese
government arranged a meeting in January 1975 for the three local force leaders to meet in
Alvor, Portugal, to discuss cooperation for “a peaceful transition to independence.” 126 The
three leaders signed the Alvor agreement, which depicted a bright future for Angola: a
transitional government until the Portuguese finished withdrawal in November 1975, a
national army comprised of forces from the three groups facilitating governance, and open
elections in October 1975 for a new post-colonial government.127 Although the agreement
was signed by all three leaders and officially endorsed by the external powers, including the
U.S., the Soviet Union, and China, neither the local forces nor the external actors had
confidence in the temporary truce. 128 Ten years’ fighting during the revolution made
cooperation almost impossible for the local forces. 129 Arms and aid that continued to flow
from the external powers to the local forces fed into the local forces’ ambition, strengthened
their resolve to fight, and assured the external powers that with their support, their local
partners were more likely to take control over Angola.130
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Emboldened by the external support, the local forces acted more aggressively. In March
1975, the FNLA launched an attack against the MPLA forces in Luanda and in the northern
territories, which marked the outbreak of the Angolan civil war. 131 After the attack, both the
Soviet Union and Cuba increased their support – the Soviets increased the supply of aid while
Cuba dispatched military commander Flavio Bravo to talk to the MPLA leader Neto. 132 After
Neto identified his group’s main problem as not knowing how to use the Soviet weapons,
Cuba sent 230 advisers to Angola to operate four training camps for the MPLA forces. 133
Upon the MPLA’s request, Cuba sent in more advisers in the following months. The number
of Cuban advisers in Angola reached around 1,500 in mid-October.134 With the Soviet
weapons and the Cuban advisors, the MPLA took control over Luanda on July 9, and
gradually won over “twelve of the fifteen provinces.” 135 The MPLA’s control over the
capital severely unnerved FNLA, UNITA, and South Africa – if the MPLA were still in
control over Luanda by the time the Portuguese left, it “would be able to claim de facto
control of Angola.”136 Facing this dire situation, the FNLA and UNITA formally joined
forces, South Africa directly intervened in the war with 5,000 to 10,000 troops, and Zaire
launched an attack against MPLA from the north. 137 Even with the Soviet and Cuban aid and
advisors, the MPLA was no match for the South African forces. 138 The South African forces
effectively halted the MPLA’s advance and were “less than 200 miles from Luanda” on the
last day of the Portuguese withdrawal. 139 Facing South Africa’s invasion, Cuba felt obliged to
intervene with military forces to save the MPLA from the defeat. 140 Havana started deploying
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troops in November.141 The rate of deployment reached 400 troops per week by December
and 1,000 per week by January 1976.142 Cuba’s support proved to be efficient and successful.
The MPLA stopped the “South African advance in the south and the Zairean-FNLA offensive
in the north” by December 1975, pushed the South Africans across the Angola-Namibia
border by January 1976, and forced the FNLA to retreat back to Zaire by mid-February.143
Since most of the opponents were forced to leave Angola, MPLA took control over the
country in March. 144
As demonstrated above, the conflict in Angola was extremely complicated with a variety
of local actors and external actors involved. Among multiple external power-local force
relationships in Angola, the following discussion will focus on the relationship between the
Soviet Union and Cuba to best demonstrate this paper’s argument.

The Soviet Union and Cuba: Cuba as an international paladin
This section discusses the relationship between the Soviet Union and Cuba during their
intervention in Angola. Even though Cuba was not a local force in the Angolan civil war, the
dynamic between the Soviet Union and Cuba has two main characteristics that make it
relevant and useful in testing this paper’s argument. First, the Soviet Union provided support
for the Cuban ground forces to achieve a set of objectives in Angola and in Africa. 145 During
the Cold War, when the two superpowers were competing for influence around the world, it
is reasonable to assume that the Soviet Union had a set of objectives that it hoped to achieve
in Africa. Whether these objectives were deliberate and expansionist in nature or reactive and
opportunistic will be discussed in more detail later. 146 In the case of Angola, the Soviet Union
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was not willing to take the risk of sending in combat forces or military advisers. 147 Instead, it
provided aid and arms to support the MPLA and the Cuban ground forces. 148 Cuba, on the
other hand, deployed 15,000 to 18,000 troops to fight alongside the MPLA between
November 1975 and March 1976. 149 Before intervening in Angola, Cuba had already
developed a military presence in the 1960s in a number of African countries.150 Given its
direct military intervention during the Angolan civil war and its relatively long-term military
presence in the region, Cuba could be analyzed in lieu of a local force with the Soviet Union
as the external power in their relationship.
Second, a significant power disparity existed between the Soviet Union and Cuba, and
the Cuban intervention would not have been possible without the Soviet support. 151 As a
developing country with a small economy, Cuba had limited industrial capacity, a narrow
product and export range, and inadequate technological development. 152 As a result, the
Cuban economy had to rely heavily upon trade with the Soviet Union and subsidies provided
by the Soviet Union.153 Its army had to depend on the Soviet arms supply and technology
support.154 Without the support from Moscow, Havana would not have been able to sustain
its expansive presence – around 38,000 Cuban troops by the spring of 1978 – in Africa.155
Although scholars debate the dynamic between the Soviet Union and Cuba, these two
characteristics are among the shared assumptions underlying the disagreements. 156
Edward Gonzalez, in his article ‘Cuba, the Soviet Union, and Africa,’ summarizes three
main interpretations of the relationship between the Soviet Union and Cuba.157 First, Cuba is
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perceived as “a Soviet-direct surrogate” or “an instrument of Soviet foreign policy” in
Africa.158 Second, the Fidel Castro regime is appreciated as “a self-directed revolutionary
internationalist” regime, devoted to the mission of “combatting imperialism and promoting
national liberation and socialism in the Third World.”159 The third interpretation argues that
instead of acting as a surrogate or a completely independent internationalist regime, Cuba
was “a self-motivated international paladin which must necessarily operate within the
parameters of Soviet political and strategic interests in Africa but which nevertheless pursues
its own objectives in the region.” 160 This interpretation is Gonzalez’s main argument, which
also aligns with this paper’s position that local forces could pursue their own objectives
through manipulating external support.
Scholars who perceive Cuba as “a Soviet-direct surrogate” argue that Cuba was directed
and sponsored by the Soviet Union to intervene in Angola, in order to achieve Soviet political
and strategic objectives in the region. 161 This argument assumes an activist and expansionist
Soviet strategy in Africa, through which the Soviets could implement their “grand design”
and pursue their strategic interests in the region. 162 The Soviet Union’s intervention in Angola
was believed to be a part of the grand design, which had two main objectives.
First, the Soviet Union had high expectations for expanding its political influence in
Africa through inducing direct and rapid socialist revolutions. 163 Jiri Valenta argues that
Nikita Khrushchev intended to promote socialism in Africa through supporting left-leaning
local forces in national liberation movements. 164 With Soviet support, Khrushchev hoped to
turn national liberation movements into socialist transitions, which would then expand Soviet
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political influence in Africa. 165 Soviet support for the MPLA in Angola during the early
1960s has been used as an example to support this argument. John Marcum argues that
Moscow noticed the Marxist origin of the MPLA and described it as a group that was
“founded on the initiative of the Communist Party” in a Soviet handbook published in
1962.166 In addition to the Marxist origin, Neto, the leader of MPLA, made a lot of efforts,
including maintaining a close relationship with Castro and making contact with the
Portuguese Communist Party, to convince Moscow that the MPLA had the intention and
“potential for revolutionary transformations.” 167 After picking up these signals, Moscow
started to send in political and material support for the MPLA in the early 1960s. 168 The fact
that Soviet support started before the U.S.-Soviet détente and the Sino-Soviet rivalry shows
that intervention in Angola was active, not reactive, planned ahead, and aimed at expanding
Soviet political influence in Africa.
Second, the Soviet Union wanted to achieve a “strategic penetration of southern Africa”
and to contain other external powers’ influence in the region. 169 Gonzalez argues that the
abundance of mineral resources in southern Africa, especially in Angola, created strong
incentives for the Soviet Union to monopolize access and to maximize economic benefits.170
The Soviet Union could also benefit from control over Angolan ports, which would
strengthen the Soviet “blue-water and airlift capabilities.” 171 David Rees supports this
argument by saying that Moscow was not only trying to “create a cluster of Marxist client
states” that would do its biddings in the power struggle against the West, but also aiming at
denying the West access to “strategic resources and sea routes.” 172 Apart from access to ports
165
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and resources, Angola’s geographic location also made its regime type salient to the Soviet
Union.173 If the MPLA were defeated and Angola were governed by the pro-West and South
African backed FNLA-UNITA government, southern Africa would be more likely to stay
under minority white control, which made it hard for the Soviets to project power in the
region.174 Besides, other left-leaning local forces might lose faith in Soviet support and turn
to China for protection. 175 On the other hand, if the MPLA won the civil war and established
a pro-Soviet regime, the Soviet Union could use this as an example to encourage more
transitions to socialism and to recruit more allies in Africa. 176
Following the assumption that the Soviet Union had a “carefully thought out master plan”
with two clear objectives in Africa, scholars argue that the Soviets had strong and consistent
incentives to intervene in Angola and southern Africa. 177 Cuba, a member of the Communist
camp, would then turn out to be a useful surrogate for direct Soviet presence on the African
continent.178 The Cubans were assumed to be in full compliance with and the established
Soviet policy, which made them nothing more than an instrument at the Soviet disposal that
could be used to forward the Soviet interests.179 Peter Vanneman and Martin James describe
the Cuban forces as “a completely new instrument for the Soviet foreign policy,” which was
employed to intervene in an area that was “far from its own frontiers.” 180 T.B. Millar supports
this argument by saying that the Cubans were “little more than mercenaries in disguise.”181
While the surrogate argument perceives Cuba as a state that had little autonomy and was
in full compliance with the Soviet command during the intervention in Angola, the
internationalist argument portrays the Castro regime as an independent revolutionary power
173
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acting at its own will to fight against imperialism and to promote national liberation and
socialism in Africa. 182 In general, two sets of evidence have been used to support this
argument.
First, Castro’s strong belief in socialism, opposition to imperialism, and attention to
Cuba’s leading position in the Third World, created strong incentives for him to intervene. 183
Piero Gleijeses quotes the former Soviet ambassador to the U.S., who said “the Cubans sent
their troops to Angola on their own initiative without consulting us,” to prove that Cuba was
not a Soviet surrogate. 184 He also quotes from the memoir of Kissinger, who used to support
the surrogate argument, to show the assumption of Havana being pressured by Moscow to
intervene in order to “repay the Soviet Union for its military and economic support” as
invalid.185 Besides, Kissinger recognized Castro’s revolutionary ambition and described him
as “the most genuine revolutionary leader then in power.”186 Valenta also argues that Castro
had a revolutionary vision for the Third World and shifted his focus, during the 1960s, from
Latin America to Africa, where he thought the link of imperialism was the weakest and the
“possibility for fundamental changes” was the most significant. 187 Driven by these
ideological motivations, Castro invested not only in Angola through consistently supporting
the MPLA but also in other African countries, including Guinea, Tanzania, Somalia, and
Mozambique, to demonstrate his readiness to deploy troops on the ground to promote
socialist revolutions in Africa. 188 Compared to Cuba’s readiness, the Soviet attitude was more
cautious.189 Carla Robbins points out that when Neto approached the Soviets for help after
South Africa invaded Angola in August 1975, Moscow agreed to send more arms but refused
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to send in any military personnel. 190 Cuba, on the other hand, deployed “500 advisers from
Castro’s personal guard” to fight alongside the MPLA. 191
The second set of evidence that scholars use to show that Cuba acted on its own will
focuses on the incoherence and even clashes between the Soviet Union and Cuba about
policies and military strategies during the intervention. 192 Havana made its own decision to
deploy troops to Angola in November 1975. 193 Even when the MPLA was at the brink of
losing control over Luanda, the Soviet Union did not send in any military personnel. 194 In fact,
the Soviets did not provide any military aircraft to transport the Cubans troops and heavy
equipments either. 195 The Cubans were forced to rely on their own “leaky merchant ships and
obsolete commercial airplanes” to deliver troops to help the MPLA defend Luanda. 196 Even
though the Soviets started to use transport planes to shuttle Cuban forces in early December,
the support was still unstable – Moscow had to frequently suspend flights due to official
protests from Washington. 197 Cuba, therefore, had no choice but to use its own transport
facilities to provide reinforcements for the MPLA. 198 If Cuba were the Soviet Union’s
surrogate, one would expect better coordination and more cohesion in their actions during the
intervention.199 In addition, there were several occasions when Cuba and the Soviet Union
were in open opposition. Gleijeses argues that even with evidence suggesting that the
attempted coup against Neto in May 1977 was backed by the Soviet embassy, or at least, had
the Soviet consent, the Cubans chose to support Neto against the Russian’s will. 200 Andrew
Young, the then-U.S. ambassador to the UN, made a similar observation while testifying
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before the Senate by saying that “the Cubans and the Russians haven’t been always united in
Angola.”201 To sum up, the internationalist argument believes that the Soviet support was
provided on the basis of shared ideology and Cuba had full control over its decisions and
actions in Angola, which were motivated by Castro’s personal revolutionary ambition and
demonstrated by the open disagreements between the Soviet Union and Cuba on strategies of
intervention in Angola. 202
While both the surrogate and the internationalist arguments are valid and supported by
evidence, they only tell a part of the story in describing the relationship between the Soviet
Union and Cuba. An alternative argument, which Gonzalez calls the paladin argument,
acknowledges both arguments: Cuba’s actions were indeed contained within the boundaries
set by the Soviet objectives and support, yet it was still operating as “a self-motivated
international paladin” with motivations that were “far more complex” than simply
ideology.203 If we apply the three factors identified in the theory model – practical advantage,
relative will to fight, and misalignment of objectives – to the paladin argument, it becomes
clear that the paladin argument provides a more comprehensive description of the relationship
between the two countries in Angola.
First, Cuba’s military presence in Africa provided the Cubans with a practical advantage
over the Soviet Union, which could transform into leverage. Second, the Cuban troops on the
ground and its relative detachment from the Cold War détente gave Cuba greater resolve of
intervention, fewer domestic restrictions, and stronger incentives to exploit the Soviet
hesitance toward Angola. 204 Third, the complicated nature of Cuba’s objectives created
strong motivations for Cuba to exploit the war in Angola to prove its value to the Soviet
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Union.205 Through directly and indirectly influencing the Soviet policy toward Africa, Cuba
significantly tightened its relationship with the Soviet Union and increased its status in the
Third World.206
Practical Advantage
The first factor identified in the theoretical model is about practical advantage. Local
forces have a practical advantage over external powers because they have better
understanding of local politics and better access to local network. Possession of these
resources – local knowledge and network – makes local forces desirable partners for external
powers. Taw’s distributive domestic response theory also argues that without a thorough
understanding of the local power dynamic, the outcome of foreign policies would be
extensively filtered through the response of local actors. Consequently, external powers
choose to rely on local forces for intelligence, network, and sometimes even troops, which
gives local forces power and leverage over the external powers. In the case of the CubanSoviet intervention in Angola, even though Cuba was not a guerrilla force fighting for control
over Angola, three characteristics of the Cuban intervention – long-term military presence in
the region, greater legitimacy in the local society, and military personnel on the ground
during the conflict – allowed Cuba to take on the same role as a local force and enjoy
practical advantages and leverage over the Soviet Union.
Cuba started developing its military presence in Africa in the early years of
decolonization, through which the Cubans engaged in different types of missions and
established special ties with a variety of African countries. 207 It operated a guerrilla training
base in Ghana from 1961 to 1966, engaged combat troops in Algeria’s border conflict with
Morocco in 1963-65, operated an advisory military mission to help crush an army revolt in
Congo-Brazzaville during 1965-66, and established “new military missions in Sierra Leone in
205
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1972, Somalia in 1974, and Algeria in 1975.”208 In addition, Jorge Domínguez argues that
through a professional and specialized training program, the Cuban armed forces improved
their combat capabilities and developed “a large, competent and ready military reserve” in the
early 1970s.209 These diversified missions allowed Cuban troops to gain a better
understanding of the local politics, economy and society.
Apart from a deeper understanding of the local power dynamic, Cuba also enjoyed more
legitimacy in Africa than did the Soviet Union. 210 Domínguez argues that Cuban foreign
policy in Africa prioritized long-term objectives over short-term rewards.211 Instead of
sending just weapons and money, the Cuban foreign aid program offered “a package of
services,” including weaponry training and political education for troops, Cuban-headed
construction projects, and Cuban-led hospitals.212 Another factor that contributed to the
greater acceptance was Cuba’s identity. Gonzalez argues that certain characteristics
associated with Cuba – its identity as “a small, revolutionary state in the Third World,” the
historical and cultural linkage between its Afro-Cuban population and the African population,
and its reputation as “a committed, selfless internationalist without big-power designs on the
continent” – granted Cuba greater legitimacy to operate its political, technical, and military
missions in the region. 213 An anecdote to support this argument was President Sékou Touré of
Guinea’s decision to expel the Soviet ambassador in 1961 and then invite the Cubans to set
up a popular militia to be the guards of his regime in 1966.214 Apparently, the Cubans were
more welcome in Africa than the Soviets were.
As previously mentioned, Cuban support for the MPLA started before the eruption of the
Angolan civil war, which then intensified after South Africa’s invasion. Close and frequent
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interactions between the Cubans and the Angolans made Cuba influential in setting military
strategies during the intervention. 215 Gleijeses uses the example of “the three-year saga of
Mavinga”, a town in southeastern Angola and a gateway to UNITA’s headquarter, to show
Cuba’s role in the decision-making process.216 The Soviet military mission in Angola, headed
by Colonel-General Konstantin Kurochkin, wanted to launch an attack to capture Mavinga in
the spring of 1984.217 The Cubans, led by Jorge Risquet, Castro’s “point man in Africa,” and
General Leopoldo (“Polo”), refused to cooperate because they thought the UNITA forces in
central regions of Angola posed a greater threat. 218 Kurochkin argued that the UNITA
guerilla forces could be dealt with later and tried to convince the Cubans by citing the
example of the Soviets still fighting the bandits in Central Asia for years after the 1917 civil
war ended.219 This argument was refuted by Risquet, who pointed out that Angola was
different from Central Asia and the central regions of Angola were vital for Angola’s
economy, which meant defeating the guerrilla forces there was more important. 220 He then
added that the Soviets would not have waited so long “if the bandits had been between
Moscow and Leningrad.”221 Since the Cubans were not persuaded, Kurochkin continued to
put pressure on them by saying that the Soviet Defense Minister had approved the plan,
which was once again rejected by Polo. 222 This debate fully demonstrates Cuba’s better
knowledge of the local economy. Apart from the influence on economy, Polo was also
concerned about South Africa’s air superiority around Mavinga. 223 When the Soviets failed to
persuade the Cubans, they turned to the MPLA forces. 224 The MPLA eventually agreed to
attack Mavinga in 1985, and the outcome turned out exactly as Polo predicted: the MPLA
215
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forces were “at the mercy of the enemy’s planes” due to Angola’s inadequate air-defense
weapons.225
To sum up, Cuba’s long-term military presence in Africa gave its military not only better
local resources but also greater legitimacy. Compared to the Soviet Union, a superpower
directly involved in the Cold War confrontation, Cuba, a Third World revolutionary country,
was more likely to be accepted in Africa. These practical advantages and resources gave
Cuba power to reject Soviet orders when their judgments did not align, for example, during
the Mavinga saga. The Mavinga example shows that the Soviet Union needed Cuba’s support
to launch an attack and the Soviets did not have full control over Cuba’s actions. The
MPLA’s failure to capture Mavinga supports Taw’s argument that without thorough
understanding of the local power dynamic, the external power’s plan could easily fail.
Relative Will
The second factor discussed in the theoretical model is about relative will and domestic
political vulnerability. Arreguín-Toft and Mack argue that compared to external powers, local
forces have stronger will to fight and suffer from fewer domestic political vulnerabilities. For
the local forces, defeat in the internal conflict threatens their survival, which makes it easy
and reasonable to justify the deployment of all resources and troops. The external powers,
however, face no survival threat during the intervention, which makes it politically
impossible and unnecessary to deploy all the resources. Besides, if the intervention did not
turn out to be a quick victory, as the power disparity between external powers and local
forces suggests, constituents of the external power would question the merits of intervention
and demand a withdrawal.
In the case of the Cuban-Soviet intervention in Angola, both countries were external
powers, which means even if the intervention failed, neither state would face a threat to
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survival. Nevertheless, the relative will argument still applies because Cuba had troops on the
ground while the Soviet Union did not. As previously mentioned, the Cuban troops deployed
to Angola accumulated to 38,000 by the spring of 1978.226 The Soviet Union, however, was
unwilling to take the risk of sending in any military advisers or combat forces despite
multiple requests from the MPLA. The fact that the Cubans had troops on the ground, which
means higher stakes involved in Angola, was in and of itself a demonstration of a stronger
resolve than that of the Soviet Union. The Soviet hesitancy to invest more in Angola was
further demonstrated by its inconsistent support for the MPLA. Valenta argues that Moscow
lost confidence in the MPLA in early 1974 when the group was struggling with a military
defeat and a split group leadership. 227 The Portuguese military, which was still fighting
against the guerrilla forces before the April coup in Lisbon, almost defeated the MPLA and
made it too weak to retaliate. 228 Apart from the defeat on the military front, the MPLA
leadership split into three fragments.229 Neto, the chairman of MPLA, headed one fragment
while the other two were each headed by a vice chairman of MPLA. 230 During this
challenging time, Moscow stopped providing aid to Neto for six months and even started
supporting Daniel Chipenda, one of the vice-chairmen, who was Neto’s main opponent.231
The Soviet support for Neto did not resume until the late summer or early fall of 1974 when
Neto regained control over the organization, the Soviets lost faith in Chipenda, and Chinese
influence expanded in Angola. 232
Evidence discussed above suggests that compared to Cuba, Moscow had limited will to
intervene in Angola. Though there is no consensus over exactly why the Soviet Union did not
do more, scholars argue that both domestic and international considerations constrained
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Soviet actions. Domestically, the Soviet Union’s policy in Africa was selective rather than
expansionist.233 Internationally, the Soviet Union had to consider reactions from the U.S.,
China, and Western Europe, especially during détente.234
Regarding the Soviet strategy toward Africa, there are criticisms against the assumption
underlying the surrogate and the internationalist arguments that assume that Moscow was
pursuing an expansionist and activist strategy in Africa. Instead, critics argue that the Soviet
policy in Africa was selective and reactive.235 According to Richard Lowenthal, the Soviet
Union focused on four regions in the Third World – North Africa, the Middle East, South and
Central Asia – during the early 1970s. 236 Alexei Kosygin, the Soviet Party spokesman in
1971, named a number of target countries for future “trade and economic cooperation,”
including India, Afghanistan, Iran and Algeria, in his five-year plan speech on the 24th Party
Congress.237 What was noteworthy was the fact that these countries were targeted “not
because they had chosen a non-capitalist path of development” – as the internationalist
argument assumes – but because of their geographic and strategic characteristics, as well as
their potential to contribute to “an international division of labor.” 238 Furthermore, Kosygin
points out a shift of focus from using economic aid to project influence to establishing
stronger economic and trade ties between the Soviet Union and the Third World countries to
secure more concrete and tangible economic benefits.239 As demonstrated by the speech,
southern Africa was not a high priority for the Soviet Union in the early 1970s, which
explains Moscow’s lack of enthusiasm about the intervention in Angola. 240
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If southern Africa was only of peripheral importance to the Soviet Union, it would be
reasonable for Moscow to pursue a “selective engagement rather than expansion” policy in
Africa.241 The Soviet Union’s willingness to intervene was also further reduced by several
cases of unsuccessful transition to socialism in the 1960s. 242 President Ahmed Ben Bella of
Algeria, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, and Modibo Keita of Mali were representatives of the
“revolutionary democratic regimes,” which were all recipients of the Lenin Peace Prize and
promising candidates for socialist transition. 243 However, all three regimes were highly
unstable and soon replaced by more conservative power after the transition. 244 Moreover,
after the pro-Soviet governments in Sudan and Egypt deviated and joined the U.S. bloc, the
Soviets became “more realistic if not pessimistic” and assumed that even if an African regime
had a clear “socialist orientation,” it would be hard to escape from the Western economic
system.245 Driven by these concerns, the Soviet Union only selectively engaged in a handful
of African countries that were either of great economic and political value, such as Nigeria,
or at a strategically important locations, including Somalia, Algeria, and Tunisia. 246
Internationally, the Soviet resolve and actions were contingent upon the U.S., China, and
South Africa’s activities in Angola and constrained by détente against the United States. 247
The evidence used to support the surrogate argument – the Soviet intervention in Angola was
a part of the predetermined plan to deny other powers’ access to southern Africa – can also be
perceived from another perspective. The Soviet policy was actually reactive and opportunistic
in the sense that it did not step up the aid until the U.S. increased its support and China
started to gain momentum in Angola. 248
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After the Cuban and MPLA forces successfully forced their enemies to retreat to their
original positions, the Soviet Union became more optimistic about Angola. 249 However, its
resolve and actions to intervene were constrained by détente. 250 The Soviet Union did not
suffer from much domestic political vulnerability because authoritarian regimes gave
constituents little power to affect the country’s policies. 251 However, there were still debates
within the Soviet government. Valenta argues that even though the hardliners in Moscow,
who advocated for a more activist strategy in Angola, won the debate in 1975, concerns over
intervention endangering détente continued to be voice by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and the Ministry of Defense. 252 The Cubans also assumed that the Soviets would be
constrained by détente and adjusted their strategies accordingly. 253 For instance, during the
battle of Cuito Cuanavale in 1987, Castro ordered the deployment of Cuba’s best units of
army and the most advanced weapons to Angola without consulting the Soviet Union. 254
Castro said that “Gorbachev’s mind was entirely focused on (the forthcoming summit in)
Washington” and assumed that the Soviet Union would not do anything in Angola, which
might increase the tension and sabotage the meeting. 255 What was more interesting was
Castro’s decision to inform the Soviet Union eight days after his deployment, which forced
Moscow to accept the fait accompli.256 The Soviet Defense Minister Dmitrii Yazov was
furious at the news and said: “In any case, we don’t want to do anything that the Americans
can use against the Soviet Union and Cuba.” 257 This line of speech clearly shows the Soviet’s
mindfulness about détente and their constrained behaviors.
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To sum up, whether the Soviet Union pursued an expansionist or selective strategy in
Africa remains debatable. Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge the evidence – the
Soviets’ inconsistent aid for the MPLA, the five-year plan emphasizing regions other than
southern Africa, and the unsuccessful socialist transitions in Africa before Angola – that
supports the selective engagement interpretation. If the Soviet Union adopted a selective
engagement policy, it would therefore have limited resolve to intervene in Angola. The
Soviets’ constrained will and actions could be an opportunity for Cuba to exploit the
uncertainties in Soviet policies and to use the resources to serve its own interests. Even if
Moscow wanted to engage more in Angola in the 1970s, its resolve and actions were
constrained by détente. The Soviet mindfulness of U.S. reactions became a significant
political vulnerability, which made it possible for Castro to force a fait accompli upon the
Soviet leadership.
Diverging Objectives
The third factor in the theory model uses the principal-agent framework to argue that the
principals (external powers) must give up some control over their objectives and the actions
of achieving these objectives when they delegate the conflict to the agents (local forces).
Meanwhile, local forces also face trade-offs between resources and autonomy. In order to
receive external support, local forces have to sacrifice autonomy over their actions and to
prioritize the agenda of their sponsors. Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham argue that the
trade-off between resources and autonomy on both sides can lead to potential agency slack,
which is more likely to occur when the objectives and preferences between the principal and
the agent significantly misalign. While applying this argument to the relationship between the
Soviet Union and Cuba, we notice that although there was no significant misalignment in
objectives, the Soviets and the Cubans still had different priorities in Angola. Evidence shows
that the misalignment of objectives created incentives for Cuba to exploit the intervention to
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increase leverage against the Soviet Union, prioritize its own national interests, enhance its
status in the Third World, and even influence the Soviet policy in Africa. 258
One of the main misalignments between the Soviet Union and Cuba was about their
objectives and perceptions of Africa. 259 As discussed in the surrogate argument section, if the
Soviet Union were pursuing an expansionist strategy and implementing a carefully thoughtout grand design in Africa, Cuba would be valued as a useful instrument. However, if we
follow the interpretation that the Soviet Union adopted a selective and reactive strategy in
Africa, which means southern Africa was only of peripheral importance and the Soviets were
interested in only a handful of African countries, Cuba’s value would be significantly
discounted.260 Gonzalez argues that this interpretation would lead to an unfavorable setting
for Cuba due to mainly three reasons. First, the practical advantage that Cuba enjoyed as a
result of its long-term presence in Africa would diminish, which would reduce its leverage
against the Soviet Union and devalue itself to nothing more than “a surrogate operating at the
discretion of its patron.”261 Second, if the Soviet Union decided to only intervene in a small
number of African countries that were either of great intrinsic strategic value or targets of the
Soviet opponents’ power projection, for example, China and the U.S., Cuba would have
fewer chances to proceed with its revolutionary mission in Africa. 262 Third, given Africa’s
low priority in the Soviet strategic overview, it would be unlikely for the Soviet leadership to
provide generous support for Cuba to intervene in Africa. 263 Besides, even if Cuba were able
to accomplish “successful ventures in Africa,” it would only bring insubstantial and
temporary political influence for the Soviet Union. 264 The Cubans would therefore find it
difficult to transform their efforts and achievements in Africa into power and leverage against
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the Soviets.265 Driven by these three concerns, Cuba would have strong incentives to help the
Soviet Union gain momentum in the region and persuade the Soviets to prioritize Africa,
whereby Cuba could demonstrate its value. 266
Cuba’s active and consistent intervention in Angola convinced the Soviets to change
their attitude from passive tolerance to cautious engagement and eventually to active
support.267 The outcome of the Angola intervention – a left-leaning government in Luanda –
turned out to be very satisfying for Moscow. 268 Apart from the success in Angola, Cuba also
facilitated and encouraged Soviet intervention in Zimbabwe and Ethiopia. 269 With the support
from the Cuban military and political advisers, the Soviet Union intervened in the liberation
movement in Zimbabwe through providing “military aid to guerrilla forces based in
Mozambique and Zambia,” which had previously relied heavily upon China’s support. 270
Moreover, Cuba also assisted the Soviet intervention in Ethiopia by sending combat troops to
defend the regime from the Somali invasion and the Eritrean secession. 271 The Cuban military
presence in Ethiopia amounted to “16,000 or more military personnel” by the spring of 1978,
through which the Soviet Union secured its influence and status on the Horn of Africa even
after giving up its alliance with Somalia. 272 Gonzalez points out that these joint Cuban-Soviet
developments in Africa created “a political momentum and a military dimension that did not
exist prior to Angola.”273 These developments effectively demonstrated Cuba’s value, which
was essential for Cuba to transform “passive leverage,” meaning Moscow chose to engage
Havana after 1960 due to increasing stakes involved in Cuba, to “active leverage,” meaning
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Moscow had no choice but to increase support for Cuba due to its growing reliance on Cuba
while intervening in Africa. 274
Cuba’s increased active leverage against the Soviet Union was evident from three
aspects, which also shows that Cuba was acting like an international paladin, through which it
effectively manipulated the “Soviet Union’s big power interests and its military and
economic resources” to forward its own national interests. 275 First, Cuba obtained more and
higher quality material support from the Soviet Union, including better economic and trade
deals, and more importantly, “both symbolic and tangible rewards” for the Cuban
Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR). 276 The FAR developed a more comprehensive naming
system at the end of 1976, which created more ranks for officers, and consequently, more
long-term career opportunities. 277 Generals who made special contribution in Angola were
also promoted to new positions to recognize their achievements. 278 Apart from these
symbolic rewards, the Soviets equipped the FAR with a range of more sophisticated weapons,
including T-62 tanks, ZSU 23-4 self-propelled anti-aircraft guns and MIG-23F aircrafts, after
the intervention in Angola. 279 This equipment, together with the victories in Angola and
Ethiopia, significantly enhanced the competence and international status of the FAR. 280 What
was more important and noteworthy was the fact that the Soviets provided these weapons at
the risk of jeopardizing the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) treaty. 281 According to
Robbins, although the U.S. generally believed that the MIG-23F aircrafts were not designed
to deliver nuclear warheads, several Congress members still accused the shipment of directly
violating “the 1962 U.S.-Soviet agreement prohibiting the deployment of offensive weapons
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in Cuba” and intended to use it as an excuse to impede the passage of SALT. 282 The Soviet
Union’s willingness to take the risk of potentially harming its national interests was an
unprecedented attempt to “strengthen ties with Cuba.”283 From Cuba’s perspective, we could
argue that it proved a successful manipulation.
The second aspect is about Cuba’s increased independence in its relationship with the
Soviet Union and higher status in the Third World.284 Cuba’s greater degree of independence
is demonstrated by the divergences between the Soviet Union and Cuba on several occasions,
such as the coup against Neto in 1977 and the decision of sending troops to Cuito Cuanavale
in 1987 without informing Moscow.285 The Castro regime’s heightened international status
can be seen from Castro’s “month-long triumphal tour” in Africa in the spring of 1977 and
another trip to North Africa a year later. 286 Castro also hosted meetings with several African
leaders, started teaching and training programs in Angola, and launched more aid missions in
the region.287 In addition, Cuba was “unanimously and publicly commended” for its
achievement in Angola during the Fifth Conference of the Nonaligned Nations in Sri
Lanka.288 This was a recover of prestige for the Castro regime because Cuba was almost
kicked out of the conference three years ago. 289
Apart from better material support and higher international status, Cuba also managed to
exert direct and indirect influence on the Soviet Union regarding its policy in Africa. 290
Gonzalez distinguishes between direct and indirect influence by arguing that direct influence
was a result of the Cuban leadership’s active attempts to shape the Soviet strategy while
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indirect influence “depended on the Soviet assessments” of Cuba’s presence in Africa. 291
According to Gonzalez, Cuba exerted direct influence on the Soviet Union through mainly
two channels: political interactions and military connections. 292 Among the Cuban elites,
Fidel Castro, his brother Raúl Castro and some military generals were the strongest advocates
for high level of Cuban-Soviet intervention in Africa.293 Meanwhile, they also had the
greatest access to the Soviet leadership during the 1960s and 1970s. 294 Fidel Castro’s
internationalist rhetoric, which emphasized Cuba’s mission and obligations in Africa, and his
role as “an effective broker between the socialist camp and Africa” created incentives for the
Soviet Union to at least maintain if not strengthen the relationship with Cuba, in order to
show the Soviet commitments to the Third World. 295 When Fidel Castro visited the Soviet
Union after his African tour in the spring of 1977, he was greeted by multiple Soviet leaders
in the airport, including Leonid Brezhnev, the then-General Secretary of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).296 With the access to the Soviet leadership and the
personal contact between the two leaders, Cuba could easily engage in lobbying activities
during meetings to shape the Soviet perceptions of Africa. 297 Moreover, Gonzalez argues that
although political interactions were effective, the most influential method was through
military connections. 298 The contact between the Cuban and Soviet militaries started in 1960,
five years before the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) officially existed. 299 Through arms
shipment and training camps, the Soviet and Cuban militaries developed deep bonds, which
became “the most important institutional linkage” between the two countries in the 1960s. 300
Such bonding was strengthened during the 1970s, when the FAR became more professional
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and competent after victories in Angola and several other African countries. 301 Additionally,
meetings and exchanges between the two militaries were frequent and productive, for
example, Raúl Castro, the head of the Cuban military, “routinely met with his Soviet
counterpart” and the Soviets had military specialists stationed in Cuba “under the command
of a Soviet general.”302 Given these close relationships, Cuba could effectively affect Soviet
policies through the military.
Different from the direct influence through political and military channels, Cuba’s
indirect influence on the Soviets took a more passive form and was contingent upon the
Soviet perceptions and judgments.303 Gonzalez argues that if Moscow had a positive
perception of Cuba’s actions in Africa and saw them as beneficial for the Soviet Union, it
would be willing to allow more Cuban direct influence on its policies. 304 On the other hand, if
the Soviets concluded with a negative assessment, Cuba would only have a limited effect on
the Soviet decision-making.305 If we judge based on Cuba’s performance in Angola and
Ethiopia, it would be reasonable to assume that the Soviet Union was more likely to make a
positive assessment about Cuba’s presence in Africa.
Two major changes in the Soviet Union after the intervention in Angola support this
assumption. First, Gonzalez uses Joan Urban’s arguments to describe the debate between
“conservative sectarians” and “revolutionary sectarians” in the Soviet political system.306
Urban argues that before the Cuban-Soviet interventions, the Soviet foreign policies were
dominated by the conservative sectarians, who adopted “a highly orthodox and cautious
approach to the revolutionary process abroad, particularly in Western Europe.”307 In other
words, short-term issues, for example, détente, were prioritized over long-term, global
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revolutionary missions. 308 The revolutionary sectarians, however, stressed the importance of
revolutions, promoted more expansionist foreign policies, and even subordinated détente to
revolutionary missions. 309 Although this group initially focused on the Soviet engagements in
Western Europe, what happened in Africa during the mid-1970s served as strong evidence to
support their policies.310 Gonzalez argues that the increasing momentum and support for the
revolutionary sectarians during the 1970s could at least be partially, if not completely,
attributed to the intervention in Angola. 311 Apart from the shift in policy orientation from
conservative to revolutionary, Gonzalez argue that the Soviet Union not only redeemed its
self-esteem and international reputation, which were both low after the Soviet-backed Arab
states were defeated by Israel in the Middle East, but also demonstrated its power and global
reach through the victories in Africa. 312
The second major change can be seen from the Soviet Union’s changed perception of the
future for socialist transition in Africa. 313 According to Gonzalez, this change was due to both
the Soviet “greater capabilities for global outreach” and the Cuban political and military
presence in Africa, which stabilized the otherwise volatile and weak governments. 314 The
Soviet Union attributed the setbacks in Algeria, Ghana and Mali to the region’s
underdevelopment, the lack of population support, and the weak leadership. 315 The successful
intervention in Angola demonstrated Cuba’s capabilities and convinced the Soviets of the
value of the Cuban presence in removing these “existing structural impediments,” stabilizing
the pro-Soviet regimes in the region, and making socialist transitions in southern Africa more
manageable.316 Gonzalez points out that the Soviet Union not only recognized Cuba’s value
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but also saw its potential of consolidating the pro-Soviet countries in Africa, just as the Red
Army did in Eastern Europe after the Second World War. 317 Cuba, therefore, effectively
shaped the Soviet perceptions about the potential of Africa, moved Africa up on Moscow’s
priority list, which, as previously mentioned, could be used to advance its own interests. 318

317
318

Ibid.
Ibid., 162-163.

49

Chapter 4: United States, the Kurds, and ISIS
The ongoing Syrian civil war is currently among the most vicious and complicated
warfare in the world. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) and
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Syrian war had killed
511,000 people as of March 2018 and displaced 6.6 million internally and 5.6 million
globally.319 Apart from the high death toll and the disastrous humanitarian crisis, the chaos
created by the endless fighting among the regime, the rebels, the Kurds, and the jihadists has
presented external state and non-state actors with opportunities for exploitation and
manipulation.320 Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah chose to back the Bashar al-Assad regime while
Turkey, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries pledged their
support to the opposition force. 321 While the conflict between the Assad regime and the rebels
is already convoluted and violent enough, this is only one dimension of the war. 322 The
Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) managed to exploit the chaos and establish a branch in Syria,
through which the organization expanded into the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIS). 323
With ISIS taking control over more territories and gaining more momentum in the summer of
2014, the U.S. felt compelled to directly intervene through launching an aerial campaign and
supporting the Iraqi and Syrian Kurds, whose survival were threatened by ISIS attack, to fight
against ISIS in the region. 324 With the U.S. support, the Kurds were very effective in fighting
ISIS: Ilham Ahmed, the Kurdish co-chair of the Syrian Democratic Council, announced the
defeat of ISIS on March 21, 2019. 325 Although the power disparity between the U.S. and the
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Kurds should imply absolute U.S. control in this patronage relationship, this was not the case.
The Kurds, though with only 190,000 Peshmerga fighters in 2014 and 20,000 People's
Protection Units (YPG) fighters in 2016, the equivalent of one-tenth of the Iraqi GDP in 2013,
and no arms industry, managed to gain leverage over the U.S. and successfully manipulated
the U.S. support.326 To better understand the dynamic between the U.S. and the Kurds, it is
useful to apply the three factors identified in the theory chapter to analyze this case.
First, local forces were essential in defeating ISIS for both practical and political reasons.
Practically, the U.S. had to rely on ground forces to hold territory and to acquire human
intelligence.327 Politically, it was essential to create an alternative to ISIS for the local
population.328 Facing the fragmented local forces in Syria and Iraq, the U.S. had few good
options. In comparison, the Kurds were more homogeneous and well-organized, which later
also proved to be more effective in defeating ISIS. 329 Since the U.S. had to rely on the Kurds
to provide ground troops, local resources, and human intelligence, the Kurds had leverage
over the U.S. despite their power disadvantage in this relationship. Second, Mack and
Arreguín-Toft’s argument about relative will and political vulnerability applies well to the
U.S.-Kurds relationship. The Obama administration's failure to follow through with its
request for Assad to step down in 2011 and its inaction on the “red-line” warning in 2012
against the use of chemical weapons clearly demonstrated the U.S. lack of interest in Syria. 330
The U.S. will, with respect to intervention, was not only constrained by public opinion, which
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was mostly against more military intervention, especially the deployment of ground troops,
but also complicated by the U.S. alliance with Turkey, who strongly opposed U.S. support for
the Syrian Kurds.331 The Kurds, however, faced an imminent threat to their survival from
ISIS’s attack, which gave them much stronger resolve to fight and saved them from political
vulnerabilities.332 Third, unlike the U.S., whose goals in the Middle East were constantly
fluctuating, the Kurds had a very clear set of objectives and goals: to carve out territory and
to achieve independence and autonomy. 333 An independent and autonomous Kurdish state,
however, would further complicate the situation in Syria, destabilize Iraq, and most
importantly, threaten the interests of Turkey. 334 Although these consequences were against
the U.S. interests, the U.S. had no better choice but to continue supporting the Kurds to defeat
ISIS, which was the only clear objective of this element of the U.S. intervention in Syria. 335
Ultimately, with the ISIS currently falling apart and the U.S. pulling out of Syria, the Kurds
managed to walk away with material support from the U.S. to continue pursuing objectives
against U.S. interests.336

The Civil War: 2011-2014
The conflicts in Syria started in 2011 as street protests.337 Inspired by the Arab Spring
movement in Tunisia and Egypt, fifteen teenagers spray-painted anti-regime graffiti in Dera’a
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in mid-March 2011.338 Unfortunately, they were captured, detained and tortured by the head
of security of the province, who was also Bashar’s cousin.339 This event led to street protests
in Dera’a, to which the regime responded with live fire and killed dozens of protestors within
a week.340 If the movement in Tunis and Cairo initially had little ripple effect in Syria, Dera’a
was the spark needed to provoke open defiance and revolution against the Assad regime. 341
Thousands of people in provincial cities and the Damascus suburbs went into the streets,
protesting against injustice and repression. 342 In fear of losing face and compromising his
family’s influence, Bashar refused to punish his cousin or compensate the victims’
families.343 Instead, he deployed more lethal force to crush the protest. 344 In order to justify
the violent suppression and to protect the legitimacy of his regime, Bashar also constructed a
victim narrative, through which the protestors were described as “terrorists and fanatics.” 345
According to William Harris, the street protests in Syria, though on an unprecedented
scale, were merely the trigger for long-term ethnic, religious and social conflicts embedded in
the society.346 Harris argues that two predispositions of Assad’s tyrannical rule made the
uprising inevitable.347 First, in order to maintain “security and stability,” the Assad regime
relied heavily upon its highly developed security machine, consisting of secret police, an
extensive monitoring network, and torture chambers, to detect and prevent any signal of
dissent.348 Harris describes the Assad regime as “a secular Arab nationalist tyranny,” which
has ruled Syria under repressive Ba’athism for decades.349 Since its foundation in 1943, the
Ba’ath Party adopted an “Arab nationalist and semi-socialist” ideology, developed
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exceptional institutional strength, and cultivated deep reach within the military. 350 These
characteristics enabled the Ba’athists to not only trump other ideologies during the Cold War
but also build an efficient security machine to cultivate a culture of absolutism. 351 Specific
measures adopted by the regime include banning all ideas associated with religious
communities and forcing Arabization on ethnic minorities, especially the Kurds. 352 This longterm repression and abuse of the population created “fierce resentment, fear and loathing”
toward the regime, which makes decompression unavoidable.353 Second, the Ba’athist rule
naturally gave rise to strongmen politics – Saddam Hussein in Iraq in the late 1960s and
Hafiz al-Assad in Syria in the 1970s – and nepotism.354 Although the Ba’ath Party advocated
semi-socialism and nationalism, sectarian identity still played a substantial part in Syrian
politics. Sunni Arabs constitute the majority of the Syrian population, yet the leadership has
been dominated by the Alawite minority, or more specifically, the Assad family. 355 Assad
family members control almost all the important and lucrative positions in the government,
which subordinates the party to family interests and turns the government into a family
business.356 Over time, the obvious hypocrisy – denying political rights to ethnic groups other
than the Alawites while concentrating all the power and wealth in the hands of the Alawites –
significantly undermined the legitimacy of the regime. 357 Additionally, Harris points out that
the Syrian economy shifted from the crumbling Ba’athist socialism to an even more
destabilizing crony capitalism during the mid-1990s, which further damaged the foundation
of the regime.358 In general, the Syrian regime’s fearful and repressive security machine
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forced the population to constantly live in fear. 359 When the spillover effect of the regional
uprising got triggered by a local spark, the implosion of the Syrian regime became
inevitable.360
In addition to creating deep-rooted conflicts with its population, the Assad regime also
contributed to the survival and growth of ISIS. Harris argues that both Saddam and Bashar
maneuvered the relationship between Sunni Islamism and secular Ba’athism to strengthen
their grip of power. 361 Saddam introduced Sunni Islamic studies into his government in the
1990s to boost the regime’s legitimacy among the Sunni Arabs in Iraq. 362 Bashar, on the
other hand, directly facilitated jihadist recruitment among the Sunni Arabs in Syria and
channeled jihadists into Iraq in 2003 to distract the U.S. and to prevent an invasion. 363
According to Harris, these deliberate interactions were extremely poisonous because
they helped ease the integration between Ba’athism and Sunni Islamism in jihadist
organizations.364 After the military overthrew Saddam in 2003, the U.S. disbanded the Iraqi
army, de-Ba’athified Sunni officials in the army, and backed Nouri al-Maliki, a Shi’a Prime
Minister who started with a pragmatic approach of governance but succumbed to
sectarianism after the U.S. left. 365 Maliki’s open sectarianism favored the Shi’a and
suppressed the Sunni, which provoked widespread anger and dissent among the disbanded,
rebellious yet well-trained de-Ba’athified Sunni military personnel. 366 Harris argues that these
former military personnel became the perfect recruits for ISI and Saddam’s previous efforts
in connecting Ba’athism with Sunni Islamism served as a bridge for the integration of
Ba’athist military expertise with jihadism. 367 When ISI reinvigorated and reorganized in 2010,
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its new military was composed of highly experienced Ba’athist officers and the organization
transformed into a hybrid of jihadism and Ba’athism. 368
In Syria, Bashar tasked his intelligence agencies to breed and channel Sunni jihadists
into Iraq in 2003 to distract the U.S. so that Syria would not become the next target for U.S.
invasion.369 This strategy not only directed the focus of domestic jihadism abroad but also
allowed the regime to accumulate jihadist-related resources and intelligence, such as jihadist
prisoners, information about the identity and salary of ISIS-affiliated state employees, and
connections with the Iraqi Ba’athist network that cooperated with the Islamic State. 370 These
resources later became valuable leverage for the regime to trade information, manipulate
narratives, and maneuver the development of jihadism during the first stage of the civil
war.371 In sum, the infusion of Ba’athism with Sunni Islamism helped preserve the network
for ISI, provided recruits for the organization, and facilitated ISI’s expansion into Syria in
2013.372
The street protests turned into war in July-August 2011, during which the regime
deployed more well-equipped forces to crush the demonstration. 373 In response, some army
officers defected and created the Free Syrian Army (FSA) in late July, which was mainly
composed of Sunni Arabs.374 Although the FSA initially rejected sectarianism or Islamism,
such an effort was hard to maintain due to the difficulties of organizing scattered armed
forces and countering the rise of religious militancy. 375 With a large number of armed groups
attaching themselves to the band of FSA, the FSA was unable to effectively provide any
logistical support or a clear chain of command. 376 On the battlefield, the FSA managed to
368
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seize the Sunni suburb of Baba Amr in Homs in November 2011, but was forced to withdraw
in March 2012.377 The battle of Baba Amr, during which the regime used heavy artillery to
blockade and destroy the city in order to crush the FSA’s resolve, exemplified the fighting
between the regime and the rebels in most suburbs in Damascus and Aleppo. 378 Joseph
Holliday argues that the regime used disproportionate force to target both soldiers and
civilians to increase the cost of fighting for the rebels. 379 This was indeed the case in Baba
Amr, where hundreds of civilians were killed by the regime bombardment. 380
At the initial stage of the war, external intervention was quite limited. 381 Both Saudi
Arabia and Turkey pledged themselves to the opposition force but did not send in any
material support. 382 Although both the U.S. and the European countries asked the Assad
regime to “step aside,” neither the U.S. nor Europe took any action. 383 The rebels had to rely
on “captured regime stocks, defecting officers and soldiers, the black market, and smuggling”
for their weaponry supply, which means their aggression could be easily neutralized by the
better equipped regime force. 384 Holliday points out that even though the rebels successfully
occupied some territories in 2011, they were unable to protect and retain control due to the
insufficiency in weapons and fighters. 385
The situation changed in 2012. The opposition forces launched attacks simultaneously in
different locations, which stretched the regime force thin and made their attacks more
manageable.386 Additionally, the conflict became increasingly sectarian, which attracted more
“hardline Sunni Islamists and jihadists” to join the opposition and forced the regime to rely
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more on the minorities, mostly the Alawites and Christians. 387 The combination of effective
strategy and weakened regime force enabled the rebels to achieve some success during the
summer of 2012.388 Through occupying the eastern segment of Aleppo, the rebels’ presence
effectively threatened the airport and the military-industrial facilities in the region.389 Their
redoubts in Homs and al-Qusayr provided access to oversee the transportation between
Damascus and the coast. 390 Moreover, the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD)
joined the fight and occupied part of the northern territories in July, which also helped the
rebels preserve their momentum through 2012. 391
Apart from troubles created by the rebels on the battlefield, the regime faced greater
problems with its leadership. 392 Bashar’s brother-in-law was killed in an explosion in
Damascus and two Sunni high-ranking officers of the regime – General Manaf Talss and
Prime Minister Riyad Hijab – fled to Turkey and Jordan. 393 However, the Assad regime
managed to survive this crisis due to the Alawites’ sustained loyalty, the regime’s advantages
in air force and weaponry, the manipulation of narratives, and more importantly, the Iranian
direct intervention. 394 In early 2013, the regime imposed a blockade on the rebel-controlled
sectors in Aleppo and Homs to starve the population, block transportation and interrupt
communication, which effectively forced a stalemate in the region. 395 In August, Assad
ignored President Barack Obama’s “red line” warning and used sarin gas on the population in
rebel-controlled areas of Damascus, which killed 1,400 people. 396
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While the pendulum seemed to be swinging toward the regime in 2013, the rebels were
further challenged by their increasing fragmentation. 397 Although the rebel forces’
geographically-scattered nature increased their redundancy, making them hard to annihilate,
it also made coordination extremely difficult. 398 Besides, an increasing number of fighters left
to join the jihadists, which gave rise to a “turf warfare” within the opposition, and therefore,
consumed fighters’ morale and further weakened the group’s cohesion. 399 Although external
support for the rebels from Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the West started at the end of 2012, this
support was all somewhat distracted and constrained due to domestic political concerns. 400
Meanwhile, ISI, under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, re-emerged in Iraq in
2010, got ready to launch a new branch in Syria in August 2011, transformed into ISIS in
April 2013, and publicly announced the formation of the “caliphate” in June 2014. 401 In late
2013, ISIS started seizing the opposition’s territory.402 After conquering al-Raqqa in August,
ISIS advanced westward to the Idlib countryside, then northward to al-Bab, and eventually
occupied A’zaz, a city close to the Turkish border. 403 Although the rebels later threw ISIS out
of the northwestern part of Syria, they paid a high price, in terms of casualties and
resources.404 ISIS also managed to survive the attack and successfully retreated to the east. 405
Parallel to the conflicts in Syria, ISIS and its affiliated Sunni tribes in Iraq were also fighting
against the government and the Iraqi Kurds led by the Kurdistan Regional Government
(KRG).406 By December 2014, ISIS had taken control over major cities in Iraq, including
Fallujah, Mosul and Tikrit, and secured border crossings that connected Iraq and Syria. 407
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Despite the challenge of fighting on double front, ISIS demonstrated clear objectives and
serious executing capabilities. 408 According to Harris, the ISIS agenda in eastern Syria
included three parts. First, the priority was to acquire a “well-buffered command center,”
which pushed ISIS to take full control over al-Raqqa from Jabhat al-Nusra in January
2014.409 Second, ISIS needed access to the Turkish border to receive material supplies and
foreign recruits, which motivated ISIS to attack the Kurds in the north.410 Third, in order to
guarantee the territorial integrity of its caliphate across Syria and Iraq, ISIS needed a channel
that connected the two countries. 411 The Deir al-Zor province, which borders Iraq and lays at
the center of the joint war zone, consisting of Syria and Iraq, became the centerpiece of
ISIS’s plan.412 Although ISIS only commanded 2-3,000 troops against the 10,000 rebels in
Deir al-Zor, they had superior firepower, greater mobility and flexibility, better
communication, and a more effective supply chain.413 These characteristics enabled ISIS to
not only win over the entire Deir al-Zor province in early June 2014, but also take control
over one third of the combined territory of the two countries during the summer of 2014. 414 It
only took ISIS less than a month to seize this big chunk of territory, which further boosted
their confidence in fighting the rebels, the regime and the Kurds. 415 The battle in Deir al-Zor
between ISIS and the rebels, according to Harris, transformed the nature of the war, adding a
second focus, which centered around ISIS, to the conflict. 416 With ISIS taking control over
too many territories and gaining excessive momentum in Syria, the U.S. felt compelled to
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intervene to contain the threat and to combat terrorism.417 In September 2014, the U.S.
directly intervened in Syria through an aerial campaign against ISIS. 418

The United States and the Kurds in defeating ISIS
By the time the U.S. directly intervened in Syria in late 2014, ISIS had control over one
third of the combined territory of Syria and Iraq, had access to oilfields, and enjoyed high
momentum of recruiting more fighters and acquiring more territories. 419 Facing ISIS’s
expansion, the Obama administration decided to “leverage a relatively small footprint of U.S.
and coalition forces,” which means to intervene through launching an aerial campaign and
deploying only a limited number of Special Operations Forces, instead of a large number of
ground troops, to fight ISIS.420 The U.S.-led coalition consisted of France, Britain, Australia,
Jordan, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain. 421
According to Ash Carter, Secretary of Defense from 2015 to 2017, the U.S. resisted
sending ground troops due to mainly two reasons.422 First, a U.S. intervention with a large
number of ground troops could be perceived as an invasion, which would not be supported by
the international society, and therefore, make a coalition impossible. 423 Second, an aerial
campaign could maximize the U.S. advantages in technology, firepower, and logistics
whereas ground troops might be pulled into “ISIS’s turf.” 424 In addition to these two concerns,
two other factors that Carter did not make explicit were Obama’s reluctance to intervene and
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the public opinion against more military interventions, especially those that deploy a large
number of ground troops yet have ambiguous objectives and unclear benefits. 425
Practical Advantage
Although the U.S. aerial campaign weakened ISIS in all aspects, including manpower,
firepower, and mobility, it was not enough to defeat it.426 The U.S. still needed ground forces
for both practical and political reasons. Practically, ground forces served three main purposes
in fighting ISIS. First, it was essential to have forces on the ground to hold territories
reclaimed from ISIS. 427 Carter describes this strategy as “the lasting defeat of ISIS.” 428 This
strategy was especially important because unlike Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda, which made no
territorial commitment, or Jabhat al-Nusra, which advocated for “jihadism in one country,”
ISIS had a vision for a cross-country caliphate, which should be, according to ISIS, “the only
legitimate authority on the planet.” 429 According to Audrey Cronin, ISIS was not a terrorist
group but “a pseudo-state led by a conventional army,” in possession of territory,
infrastructure, well-developed military capabilities, and independent funding sources. 430 In
order to protect its legitimacy and maintain its attractiveness to new recruits, ISIS had to keep
conquering territories and fighting for resources. 431 Without ground troops, recovered
territories would be left unguarded, which gave ISIS chance to take them back. Second,
although the U.S. air force is unrivaled, it is no substitute for ground forces in acquiring
human intelligence. 432 ISIS’s leaders and fighters hid in cities so that they could blend in with
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civilians.433 This tactic made it hard to launch precise surgical strikes without incurring high
casualties.434 Troops on the ground, who can provide intelligence about the locations of
ISIS’s personnel and facilities, would be helpful in identifying targets and increasing the
accuracy of the attack. 435 Additionally, Carter argues that the U.S. intelligence on ISIS was so
inadequate in 2014 that the Americans had little knowledge about the identity, location and
plan of their jihadist enemies.436 The insufficiency in intelligence was only gradually
overcome in the following combat, during which the U.S. Special Operation Forces and the
local ground troops both made valuable contributions.437 The U.S. Special Forces launched a
raid in May 2015 to capture Abu Sayyaf, one of ISIS’s leaders. 438 Abu Sayyaf was killed, but
his wife and slave, along with documents and electronics were captured, through which the
U.S. obtained important information about ISIS’s leadership behavior. 439 If the U.S. launched
an airstrike against the target, it would not have been able to obtain that kind of crucial
information about ISIS. Likewise, the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Force (SDF) was
successful in seizing Manbij in August 2016. 440 This operation entailed heavy casualties but
enabled the SDF to capture former ISIS safe houses and facilities, which provided valuable
intelligence for counter-terrorism efforts in Europe and the U.S.441 These two cases both
demonstrate the importance of ground troops in acquiring human intelligence. Third, the U.S.
needed ground forces, preferably local forces, to better understand the local power dynamic.
Air bombing could effectively hit the target but would not help the U.S. gain insights into the
ongoing conflict in the war zone. 442 Philip Zelikow argues that supporting and training local
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forces is helpful because learning goes both ways.443 Interactions with local forces would fill
in gaps in the U.S. understanding, inform the U.S. strategies and tactics, and allow the U.S. to
intervene with higher credibility. 444
In addition to the practical advantages, ground forces also served political purposes.
Cronin argues that ISIS differs from al-Qaeda in many aspects, including recruiting
strategies.445 Different from Al-Qaeda’s focus on religion, ISIS appeals to people’s desire for
“adventure, personal power, a sense of self and community” or, sometimes simply, violence
and cruelty.446 ISIS’s strategy takes advantage of the young population’s need for agency and
the older generation’s desire for money and power. 447 After joining ISIS, new recruits are
immediately given the chance to fight and even sexual partners to entertain them.448 In order
to prevent ISIS from expanding into new territories or reinvigorating in recovered territories,
the U.S. had to create an alternative that could provide the local population with agency and a
sense of belonging. As mentioned in the theory chapter, local forces have much higher
legitimacy than external powers in the local sphere. This argument is supported by Howard
Clark, who points out that it is important to have citizens fighting for their own land “with
their own blood and sweat,” especially in Arab countries that involve deep-rooted tribal
affiliations and sectarian divisions.449 Clark further emphasizes that political legitimacy and
trust for local authorities are so fragile and specific that they could not easily shift to “faraway capitals,” not to mention to ground troops of external powers. 450 Clark uses the battle of
Mosul to demonstrate his point. He argues that unless the Sunni Arabs in the city decided to
rise and fight, Mosul would always be unstable and on the verge of falling to ISIS again. 451
443
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Moreover, the tactic of completely relying on an aerial campaign without troops fighting
terrorism on the ground had the risk of being manipulated by ISIS. 452 The U.S. attack against
jihadists can be twisted and described as an attack against all Muslims, which could easily
radicalize the population and invoke an urge to seek revenge.453 As a result, the U.S. had to
rely on local forces to provide the local population with agency, legitimacy and organization
to prevent ISIS from coming back.
To sum up, ground forces were essential in the war against ISIS. From a practical
perspective, the U.S. needed ground forces to hold territories, to obtain human intelligence
and to better understand the local power dynamic. Even though the Special Forces were also
effective in collecting intelligence, they were unable to hold territories and have fewer
knowledge about the local society than the local forces do. Given the fact that the Obama
administration was unwilling to deploy a large number of ground troops in Syria, supporting
local forces was the most ideal option. More importantly, the U.S. had to rely on local forces
for political reasons. To eliminate ISIS and prevent it from coming back, the U.S. needed
local forces to serve as an alternative to ISIS for the local population. This is especially
important in Syria and Iraq, where tribal, sectarian and religious identities and relationships
are so complicated and intertwined, making local authorities essential. As a result of their
practical advantages in local presence, intelligence, and legitimacy, local forces became
necessary and desirable in the war against ISIS. The U.S.’s reliance on them, in turn, gave
these local forces leverage over the U.S., despite an overall power disadvantage.
Local forces were necessary, but the many actors in Syria and Iraq meant that the U.S.
had to choose from different local partners. Despite the presence of rebels, the regime, Iran,
Russia, the Iraqi army, and the Kurds, however, the U.S. had few good options. First, the
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rebels were extremely fragmented and disorganized. 454 In general, the attention of the rebels
was mostly on the Assad regime. 455 Thus, even though they managed to form a loose
alignment among three groups to fight ISIS in November 2013 – the Islamic Front, the Syrian
Revolutionaries’ Front (SRF), and a smaller group consisting of ex-FSA fighters – that jointly
commanded 80,000 fighters across Syria, no central authority or coordination mechanism
existed to bring all the fighters to the battlefield to fight alongside each other. 456 According to
Carter, the U.S. plan for Syria in 2014 was to recruit and train individual rebel fighters, who
would then assemble into a new force. 457 This plan apparently failed because it was too costly
and time-consuming.458 Sadly, after pouring millions of dollars into recruiting and training
fighters in Syria, the U.S. only had around “60 dependable anti-ISIS fighters” deployed in
Syria in July 2015. 459 Some rebel trainees even gave U.S. weapons to Jabhat al-Nusra in
order to get safe passage through the terrorist-controlled areas in September 2015. 460 Besides,
the rebels also had a terrible human rights record: they killed 190 Alawites in a massacre in
September 2013, among which 57 were women and 18 were children. 461 To sum up, the
rebels’ fragmentation, focus on fighting Assad, connection with terrorist groups, and
atrocious human rights record discouraged the U.S. from providing support for them to fight
ISIS.
Second, supporting the Assad regime was not feasible. The regime forces and ISIS
stayed out of each other’s way before the summer of 2014. 462 More importantly, it would be
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impossible for the U.S. to support a regime that had used poison gas on its citizens. 463 Third,
Iran and Russia mostly used ISIS as a cover to justify their intervention in Syria. 464 Iran sent
Quds Force advisers and weapons to support the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in Iraq
to fight ISIS.465 Iran’s priority, however, was to strengthen the power of Shi’a Arabs and
promote Shi’a dominance in Iraq. 466 During battles against ISIS in Iraq when both the Iranbacked Shi’a militias and the U.S. were involved, the Shi’a forces wanted independent
victories, rejected U.S. involvement, and even threatened to fight the Americans. 467 The idea
of coordinating with Iran would not be supported by the U.S. Congress or the American
public, either. In terms of Russia, although the Russians frequently expressed their intention
to fight ISIS, such gesture was merely a cover for their true intention, which was to help
Assad win the war so that Syria would be their “remaining foothold in the Middle East.” 468
Russia deployed “500 Russian marines and ‘dozen’ of combat airplanes and attack
helicopters” to Syria in September 2015 for the purpose of counter-terrorism.469 In reality,
however, all these personnel and weapons were used to attack the rebels and “not a single
bomb fell on the ISIS caliphate.” 470 Fourth, the U.S. tried to rebuild and re-equip the Iraqi
army as an indigenous force to fight ISIS. 471 While planning to retake Mosul in February
2015, the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander Lloyd Austin intended
to rely on the Iraqi army, which, according to Carter, barely existed on paper. 472 The fact that
it would take too long for the Iraqi army to be ready to fight made them not ideal for
cooperation.
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Compared to the four local presence discussed above, the Iraqi and Syrian Kurds had
three main characteristics that made them a useful ally on the ground for the U.S.-led
coalition in the war against ISIS. First, the Kurds were relatively homogeneous, wellorganized and militarily capable. 473 Although the Kurds had and still have internal divisions,
the existential threat posed by ISIS brought the Iraqi Kurds and the Syrian Kurds together. 474
The Iraqi Kurds have been governed by the KRG and guarded by the Peshmerga, while the
Syrian Kurds have been ruled by the PYD and protected by the YPG.475 The YPG, upon the
U.S. request, adopted a new name – the Syrian Democratic Force (SDF) – in July 2017.476
Both the Peshmerga and the YPG had been established militaries before ISIS attacked the
Kurds, which saved the U.S. from having to build an army from scratch and allowed the U.S.
military support to be “plugged into the already-existing groups.”477 The Crisis Group Middle
East Report in May 2015 quoted a European diplomat, who said that the coalition chose to
support the Iraqi Kurds mainly because of the Peshmerga, which was perceived as “a wellorganized counterpart” to the U.S.-led coalition’s military. 478 Second, the narrative that the
U.S. was supporting and protecting a minority group under existential threat in the Middle
East sold well in the government and among the public. 479 Masoud Barzani, the president of
KRG, also sent compelling message to persuade the West to support the Kurds in fighting
against ISIS. Barzani told the Washington Post that ISIS not only posed a threat to the Middle
East but also to the entire world. 480 More importantly, he emphasized that the Kurds cannot
fight ISIS alone and invited the U.S. to support the Kurds, a group of force that was “the
United States’ staunch allies in the region … the only force in the area with the means and
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will to protect thousands of lives from the horrors that these terrorists bring.” 481 Third, the
U.S. had a long-term and well-established relationship with KRG and Peshmerga before the
war started.482 Peshmerga had facilitated U.S. intelligence gathering in the region and
benefited from the U.S. military support since the U.S. invasion of Iraq. 483 This relatively
long-standing alliance could at least reassure the U.S. that the KRG would “use weapons for
the right purpose,” which made them a trustworthy partner. 484 Different from the relationship
between the U.S and the KRG, the U.S. support for the PYD was more recent. 485 According
to Harris, the U.S. saw the PYD as “an effective but insufficient ground force against ISIS” in
2014.486 Despite its insufficiency at the beginning, YPG proved its capacity and acquired
recognition during the Kobani battle in October 2015.487
Given the importance of ground troops in fighting ISIS and the characteristics of other
local forces in Syria and Iraq, the U.S. decided to support the Iraqi and the Syrian Kurds. The
U.S. provided the Kurds with weapons, training and logistical support, while at the same time,
relying on them to provide “logistical and operational collaboration” on the ground. 488 The
U.S. support empowered the Kurds, which created opportunities for them to acquire leverage,
enhance status, and even manipulate the relationship with the U.S. As briefly mentioned
above, the YPG made significant contributions to the success in the battle of Kobani. The
victory changed the U.S. government’s perception of Kobani, reflected through John Kerry’s
rhetoric, from not on the “level of strategic objective” to “a big deal.” 489 This battle
demonstrated the military capability of YPG, which was immediately promoted to “the head

481

Ibid.
Harris, 108.
483
"Kurdish Peshmerga," The Kurdish Project, https://thekurdishproject.org/history-and-culture/kurdishnationalism/kurdish-peshmerga/.
484
"Arming Iraq’s Kurds: Fighting IS, Inviting Conflict," 18.
485
Harris, 107.
486
Ibid.
487
Ibid., 119.
488
Ibid., 113.
489
Ibid., 119.
482

69

of a new front of Arab and other non-Kurdish factions” in the following month. 490 Another
example that shows the Kurds manipulating U.S. support was during the Mosul battle in
2016.491 While the U.S. was planning to retake Mosul, ISIS’s center in Iraq, the KRG and the
Iraqi government were involved in an oil dispute. 492 Oil was a crucial element for the KRG to
gain sovereignty, but Baghdad was unwilling to compromise. 493 The U.S. initially had no part
in this dispute but needed logistical and operational support from the Peshmerga, which was
in control of land surrounding Mosul, to defeat ISIS in Mosul. 494 The KRG then effectively
used its local presence as a leverage and made it explicit that it would not cooperate unless
the oil dispute was settled in their favor.495 Eventually, the U.S. envoy Brett McGurk acted as
a mediator for five months and achieved an agreement in the interests of the KRG in
exchange for Peshmerga’s “full, enthusiastic collaboration in the Mosul battle.” 496
Relative Will
In addition to the practical advantage as a result of their local presence, knowledge, and
network, the Kurds also had stronger will to fight than the U.S. did in Syria. According to
Mack and Arreguín-Toft, local forces tend to have stronger will to fight because they have
higher stakes involved in the conflict and are constrained by fewer political vulnerabilities.
For the external powers, whose survival and security are not under threat, they are more
likely to face pressure from their political institutions and society, demanding a quick victory
to justify the resources deployed for the intervention. If it is widely known that the external
power’s will of intervention is constrained by domestic politics or public opinion, local forces
would not expect a long-term relationship, and then have incentives to manipulate and exploit
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external support to pursue their own objectives. This argument is well-supported by the
relationship between the Kurds and the U.S. in fighting ISIS.
ISIS targeted the Kurds for mainly two reasons. First, the Kurds prioritized ethnic
identity over religious identity. 497 The PYD’s campaign for “secularism, socialism, and
gender equality” was perceived by ISIS as being godless. 498 Second, the Syrian Kurds
occupied territories in northern Syria, which blocked ISIS communication with its cells in
Turkey and Europe and obstructed transportation of foreign recruits from Turkey into
Syria.499 The Kurd-controlled Kobani was especially important because it was in the middle
of Aleppo – ISIS was in charge of “the Syrian side of the Turkish border northeast of Aleppo”
in 2014 – and al-Raqqa, ISIS’s headquarter. 500 According to Harris, ISIS wanted to acquire as
much control over the Syrian-Turkish border as possible so that it could penetrate Turkey,
which had mostly been focusing on the PYD’s presence on the border. 501 Unlike the Syrian
Kurds, the Iraqi Kurds were not “an immediate target” for ISIS in 2014 because they did not
hold territories that stood in ISIS’s way. 502 However, their territories and resources in
northern Iraq still made an ISIS attack inevitable. 503
Both the Iraqi and the Syrian Kurds faced existential threat from ISIS’s attack in 2014. 504
ISIS surrounded villages around Sinjar, a Yazidi town west of Mosul, on August 3, 2014. 505
The Peshmerga militia stationed in the region was no match for ISIS, which was equipped
with American weapons captured from the Iraqi army. 506 Besides, ISIS was so well informed
that it had precise information about the identity and location of the Sunnis, Christians and
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Yazidis in the village, which allowed it to plan accordingly. 507 While facing this strong
enemy and its efficient attack, the Peshmerga lost confidence, disassembled, and left the
50,000 people in the Sinjar Mountain on their own. 508 Four days after capturing Sinjar, ISIS
seized the Mosul dam – the largest dam in Iraq – and started advancing toward Erbil. 509 In
order to save the KRG from this crisis, the U.S. intervened through aerial campaign, which
enabled the Peshmerga to hold Erbil, recover the Mosul dam, and evacuate the population in
the mountains.510 In Syria, although the YPG managed to resist ISIS in July 2014, it was still
not strong enough to fend off the ISIS’s major attack against the Kobani canton in midSeptember.511 The YPG held only “a pocket in Kobani town” by early October, which forced
the majority of the population to flee across the border into Turkey. 512 Despite Turkey’s
opposition to the U.S. supporting the YPG, the U.S.-led coalition still intervened through air
bombing to protect the Syrian Kurds. 513 This support allowed the YPG to win the battle in
January 2015 and regain all the lost territory in the canton by mid-March.514
Unlike the Kurds, the U.S. faced no existential threat in the civil war of Syria. Although
ISIS was a formidable enemy that threatened the U.S. national interests, it posed no threat to
U.S. survival. Given the power disparity between the U.S. and ISIS, it would be unreasonable
and politically impossible for the U.S. to deploy all of its resources, as the Kurds would, to
fight ISIS. Besides, the U.S. was much more domestically-politically vulnerable than the
Kurds, which significantly constrained its will. According to the survey conducted by the
Pew Research Center in 2012, 64% of the U.S. population did not support intervention in
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Syria, 62% opposed airstrikes and 63% were against the idea of supporting the rebels. 515
Another survey conducted in September 2013 showed that 74% believed that airstrikes would
“create a backlash against the U.S. and its allies in the region” and 61% expected long-term
U.S. military commitment in Syria. 516 In terms of public support for U.S. campaign against
ISIS, the majority supported the campaign but only 30% believed that the U.S. had “a clear
goal in taking military action.” 517 In general, the U.S. public was not in favor of another
military intervention in the Middle East, which could be an important factor that constrained
the Obama administration’s will of intervention, especially during the initial stages of the
civil war.
The U.S. limited interests in Syria were well demonstrated and widely known after two
empty threats from the Obama administration. First, the U.S. government asked Assad to
“step aside” in 2011 but did not follow through with any actions. 518 This behavior sent a clear
message that the U.S. was no friend of Assad, but also signaled the U.S. limited interests in a
direct intervention in Syria, which emboldened the regime and the jihadists. 519 Second,
Obama explicitly declared that the use of chemical weapons was the “red line” that would
trigger direct military intervention from the U.S.520 However, the U.S. government had no
reaction when the Assad regime released a small amount of poison gas in mid-2013, which
showed the U.S. unwillingness to intervene and encouraged Assad to release a large quantity
of sarin gas in rebel-controlled areas of Damascus in August 2013. 521 Once again, the Obama
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administration did not actualize its threat of intervention, and Assad was let off the hook after
chemical disarmament. 522
Although the U.S. threat of intervention did not directly affect the Kurds, they could not
help but notice the U.S.’s small appetite for more intervention in the Middle East. This
perception led the Kurds to doubt the U.S. long-term commitment to their cause after the war
against ISIS ended, which likely motivated them to seize the moment and exploit U.S.
support when they had the chance. 523 For the Syrian Kurds, their alliance with the U.S. was
already shaky while they were still fighting ISIS. 524 Unlike the long-term and wellestablished relationship between the U.S. and KRG, the U.S. alliance with PYD was more
recent.525 As discussed above, the Syrian Kurds were the only meaningful ally on the ground
that the U.S. had in Syria.526 With the U.S. support, the YPG fighters were very efficient in
fighting ISIS.527 They effectively forced ISIS to withdraw from the north and fall back to alRaqqa and the Euphrates Banks in early 2017, defeated ISIS in al-Raqqa in October, reduced
the number of ISIS fighters in Iraq and Syria to 1,000 by December 2017, attacked ISIS’s last
foothold in eastern Syria in November 2018, and captured Baghouz, the last piece of territory
held by ISIS, in March 2019. 528 After recognizing the YPG’s capability and contribution, the
U.S. stepped up its arms supply in May 2017. 529 This support, however, was strongly
opposed by Turkey, which saw the PYD as an offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party
(PKK), a terrorist-separatist group that has been trying to gain independence and divide
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Turkey since the 1980s. 530 After the victory in al-Raqqa in October, the U.S. conceded to
Turkey’s strong opposition and cut off the arms supply in November. 531
There were three Kurdish uprisings in Turkey during the 1920s and 30s.532 Though the
Turkish government managed to crush all three, the Kurds’ ambition of independence always
kept Ankara on edge, and inevitably, gave rise to a range of repressive policies, including
banning all Kurdish organizations, closing down all Kurdish schools, and closely monitoring
Kurdish activities across the border in Syria and Iraq. 533 The fact that one of the three
uprisings was planned by Khoybun, “the first transnational Kurdish political party,” and
launched through their Syrian base explained Turkey’s concern about the PYD gaining more
power in Syria.534 Besides, the PYD does have a close relationship with the terrorist group
PKK.535 It was founded by the PKK in 2003 and the YPG militia was constructed in 20112012 with support from PKK.536 After the establishment of the YPG, the PYD managed to
consolidate power and marginalize the Kurdish National Council (KNC), which had been
willing to trade the Syrian Kurds’ collaboration in fighting the regime for Turkey’s
recognition of “Kurdish identity and grievances” before the PYD became more dominant. 537
Turkey had two major concerns after the Kurds joined the fight in Syria. 538 First, Turkey
was worried about the Syrian Kurds cooperating with the Assad regime. 539 Hostilities
between Syria and Turkey started to develop after Assad rejected Turkey’s suggestion of
political reform and personally confronted the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdogan in
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2011.540 With the street protests evolving into a civil war in 2011, Turkey started providing
support for the rebels and the jihadists to fight for a regime change in Syria. 541 This
intervention marked the end of Turkey’s “zero-problems with neighbors” foreign policy in
the region.542 In terms of the PYD and the regime, Turkey accused the PYD of acting as “a
surrogate for the Assad regime and the PKK,” since the PYD not only shared al-Qamishli, a
major border city, with the regime, but also was a member of the National Coordination
Committee (NCC), an agency that was commonly known as the “regime tool.” 543 Second,
Turkey perceived the PYD’s contribution to the war against ISIS as a design by the PKK to
demonstrate capability and power, which would strengthen the Kurdish population’s resolve
to fight for independence. 544 Even though the PYD leader Salih Muslim said during an
interview in July 2015 that the Syrian Kurds had no intention to be independent, Turkey was
still worried about the Kurds acquiring territorial continuity along the Syrian-Turkish border,
which could not only lead to the Syrian Kurds’ independence but also unsettle the Kurdish
population in Turkey. 545
The bitter history between the Turks and the Kurds along with Turkey’s suspicion
toward the rising PYD led to Turkey’s judgment about the PYD: it was as much of a threat as
ISIS, if not more. 546 The most ideal scenario then would be to have these two enemies wear
each other out in Syria. 547 As a result, Turkey refused to provide help when the Syrian Kurds
faced an existential threat in 2014 and strongly opposed the U.S. support for the YPG as
well.548 When the U.S.-backed YPG fought for survival in Kobani, a city on the Syrian-
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Turkish border, in October 2014, Turkey was motionless.549 This indifferent attitude not only
irritated the PYD leader Muslim, who accused Turkey’s Justice and Development Party
(AKP) of colluding with ISIS to eliminate the Kurds, but also undermined the AKP’s
credibility among its own Kurdish population. 550 Moreover, prior to the battle to retake alRaqqa from ISIS in 2016, Turkey wanted to replace the YPG-dominated SDF to fight
alongside the U.S. and achieve “a high-profile victory” in Raqqa. 551 Erdogan said to Obama
in October 2016 that an alliance between Turkey and the U.S. had sufficient power to defeat
ISIS and they did not need “terror organizations like the PYD and the YPG in Raqqa.” 552
Although it would indeed be helpful to partner with a NATO ally, the U.S. ignored Erdogan’s
suggestion.553 The SDF’s solid track record of combating ISIS and the familiarity established
during previous cooperation made SDF a preferable choice. 554 Besides, the U.S. needed the
SDF to move deeper and to fight ISIS in Deir al-Zor, one of ISIS’s last few holdings.555 The
U.S. dismissal of Turkey’s lobbying gave rise to discontent in the AKP, which blamed the
U.S. for prioritizing its relationship with the PYD over the territorial integrity of Turkey.556
Meanwhile, the AKP and the PKK continued to engage in skirmishes. 557 The PKK attacked
Turkish state institutions in 2016; Turkey launched airstrike against the YPG in northeastern
Syria in April 2017, which forced the U.S. to conduct border patrol to prevent more clashes;
and the SDF had to suspend their offensive on ISIS in November 2018 due to attacks from
Turkey on Syrian Kurds in northern Syria. 558
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Caught up in the conflict among Turkey, the PKK, and the Syrian Kurds, the U.S. found
it hard to balance its interests and allegiances. On one hand, the U.S. needed the PYD, which
had proven to be very militarily effective and capable, to eliminate ISIS. On the other hand,
the U.S. could not ignore the protest from its NATO ally. 559 In the short-term, the U.S. could
use the Turkish Incirlik air base to launch its aerial campaign, while in the long-term, Turkey
is of great strategic importance to the U.S. 560 From the Kurds’ perspective, the U.S. rhetoric
of describing its relationship with the YPG as “temporary, transactional, and tactical” in May
2017, its decision to stop arms supply for the PYD after the victory in al-Raqqa, and the U.S.
acquiescence to Turkey’s frequent bombing of the SDF were clear signals of the U.S.’s
limited will to commit to a long-term relationship with the PYD after the defeat of ISIS. 561
Toward the end of 2018, Turkey constantly threatened to invade the Kurd-controlled
parts of northern Syria. 562 President Donald Trump’s order to withdraw the 2,000 American
troops from Syria on December 19 further unnerved the Kurds.563 Without the deterrence
provided by the U.S. military presence, the Syrian Kurds were, once again, surrounded by the
Russia- and Iran-backed Assad regime and the increasingly hostile Turkey. 564 In response, the
Kurds reached out to the Assad regime on December 28 for protection against Turkey. 565 The
Assad regime had long wanted to regain control over northern Syria but had been deterred by
the U.S. presence.566 Reconciliation with the Assad regime would significantly strengthen
Russia and Iran’s power, which could undermine the U.S. influence in the region. 567 The
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Syrian Kurds’ decision to reach out to Assad without informing the U.S. could be seen as a
strategy to threaten the U.S. and send the message that if the U.S. abandoned the Kurds, they
could easily turn to the enemies. 568 Such a strategy led to Trump’s threat to impose economic
sanctions on Turkey as a response to the Turkish military buildup on the border in January
2019, his decision to leave 200 American troops in Syria in February, and discussions in the
Pentagon to allow the Kurds to keep the American-supplied weapons.569 To sum up, when the
U.S. limited will for long-term commitment became obvious, the Kurds leveraged other
players, including the Assad regime, Russia and Iran, to influence the U.S. decision of
withdrawal from Syria.
Diverging Objectives
The third factor in the theoretical framework is about diverging objectives. According to
Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham, agency slack, which means local forces have
incentives to escape from the external powers’ control so that they could have more
autonomy to pursue their own objectives, exists in the relationship between external powers
and local forces. The problem would be more significant if the objectives of the two actors
severely misalign, which was indeed the case in the relationship between the U.S. and the
Kurds.
Around 30 million Kurds are currently residing in four countries: Syria, Iraq, Turkey and
Iran.570 After the Ottoman Empire disintegrated during the First World War, the Kurds were
given the chance to hold an independent referendum, as specified in the 1920 Treaty of
Sevres.571 However, Treaty of Sevres was re-negotiated between the new Turkish
government, which came to power after Turkey’s war of independence in 1923, and the
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Allies.572 The re-negotiation granted Turkey sovereignty over the otherwise potentially
independent Kurdistan, and subsequently, gave rise to Kurdish nationalism and the persistent
demand for independence in the region. 573
During the 20th century, the Kurdish population in the four countries all organized
insurgencies and caused serious problems for their host governments in one way or
another.574 The Turkish Kurds organized three rebellions in 1925, 1930, and 1938, which
were all crushed by the Turkish government. 575 The most recent rebellious movements have
been headed by the PKK, which has haunted the AKP for almost three decades. 576 Iran was
troubled by the Kurds in 1946, when the Soviet-backed Iranian Kurds “established the first
genuine Kurdish government.” 577 Though the government only existed for a year, it was still
a serious attempt to break away from the Iranian rule. 578 As for Iraq, their Kurdish population
were used by Iran – their protracted enemy – to fight against the Iraqi government during the
1960s and 1970s.579 Iran abandoned the Kurds in 1975 after making a deal with Saddam
Hussein over “the sharing of the Shatt al-Arab, the waterway in which the Tigris and
Euphrates converge as they approach the Gulf.” 580 The Shah of Iran exchanged Iran’s support
of the Kurds for the control over “the deepest point” of the river. 581 In terms of the Syrian
Kurds, their major movement toward independence started during the Syrian civil war.582
In response to the Kurdish rebellions, which posed a significant security threat to
national interests and territorial integrity, all four host countries adopted measures to repress
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the Kurdish population. 583 Turkey, Iran, and Syria all banned Kurdish language, schools, and
organizations.584 Turkey burned down villages; Iraq slaughtered Kurds during its 1988 Anfal
counterinsurgency campaign; and Syria “revoked the citizenship of tens of thousands of
Syrian Kurds” in the 1960s. 585 Despite all these atrocities, the Kurds have never perceived
themselves as a minority and have continued to hold onto their ambition of independence and
autonomy.586 The Iranian and Turkish Kurds are both under close surveillance and strict
control by their governments, which gives them few chances to acquire power and gain
autonomy.587 The Iraqi and Syrian Kurds, on the other hand, have effectively exploited the
chaos during the civil war and manipulated the U.S. support while fighting ISIS, thus making
significant progress since 2011. 588 In terms of territory held, U.S. support enabled the Iraqi
and the Syrian Kurds to not only keep their previous territories but also acquire new ones
after throwing out ISIS. 589 The KRG captured new territories that were of great symbolic and
cultural value to the Kurds and also took control over the valuable Mosul dam after defeating
ISIS in Sinjar in November 2015. 590 By mid-2017, the land captured during the process of
fighting ISIS amounted to more than half of KRG’s own territory before the war. From the
KRG’s perspective, the newly acquired territory was a part of the “disputed territory subject
to Kurdish claim,” which means they intended to keep all of them. 591
The territorial gain was even more significant for the Syrian Kurds. Before the war, the
three Kurdish cantons – Jazira, Kobani, and Afrin – were widely separated, adjacent to
unfriendly Sunni Arab factions, and had no access to the Syrian-Turkish border. 592 Jazira and
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Kobani had no geographical depth, which made them easy to penetrate and conquer. 593 The
Kurds also had to tolerate the presence of the regime’s intelligence service in Jazira. 594 After
the U.S. started supporting the PYD to fight ISIS, the PYD took advantage of the U.S. air
power and the “U.S. veto against Turkish interference” to substitute ISIS on the land that
would connect the three cantons.595 The SDF, with support from the U.S. airstrikes and the
Special Forces advisers, defeated ISIS and captured the land in the Manbij district in August
2016, which filled in the gap between Afrin and Kobani cantons. 596 Turkey was furious about
the PYD’s expansion in territory and retaliated through shelling the SDF and channeling
more ISIS fighters into Syria. 597 These behaviors provoked warnings from both the U.S. and
Russia.598 By December 2018, the SDF controlled about a quarter of Syria with oil fields,
agriculture, and three major cities, which represented an unprecedented expansion of territory
and power.599
In addition to the territorial gain, the Syrian Kurds also achieved much greater cohesion
among their previously divided factions and benefited from more international recognition,
legitimacy and support. 600 Henri Barkey argues that the existential threat as a result of ISIS’s
attacks brought the Kurdish factions together. 601 The experience of jointly fighting a common
enemy could facilitate military and political integration among the Kurds, which could
contribute to the formation of “pan-Kurdish military units” and identities. 602 Moreover, he
also points out that fighting alongside the U.S. has made the PYD famous and the Kurdish
plea well-known in the West, especially in Europe. 603 The KRG received diplomatic
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recognition from the U.S., France, and Britain, which represented an unprecedentedly high
level of international recognition and legitimacy. 604 In terms of the revival of Kurdish
language and culture, both the KRG and the PYD introduced Kurdish language education in
areas under their control.605 In sum, the Iraqi and the Syrian Kurds emerged from the Syrian
civil war much more powerful in all aspects, including territorial holdings, international
legitimacy, and soft power. Their expansion of power was mostly a result of U.S. support
while fighting ISIS. While Kurds have become more powerful, they have more potential to
achieve independence and autonomy in the Middle East, which, in fact, would go against the
U.S. interests in the region.
An independent Kurdistan or the Kurds acquiring more power in the region would
drastically change the balance of power in the Middle East and lead to instability in Iraq,
Syria, Turkey, and Iran, which are not in the U.S. interests. 606 In Iraq, the KRG leader
Massoud Barzani’s decision to hold a referendum on Kurdish independence created a chaos
not only between Baghdad and Erbil but also among the external powers in late 2017. 607
Though the result of the referendum, which showed that the majority voted for independence,
would not be legally binding, the U.S., UK and Russia all urged the KRG to postpone while
Iraq, Iran, and Turkey imposed “economic, security and diplomatic sanctions” to pressure the
KRG to cancel the referendum. 608 The fact that this referendum was initiated by the Kurdish
government and the KRG had gained so much power and territories through fighting ISIS
made the Kurdish independence threat real. 609 When the threat was no longer simply an issue
on paper, the integrity of Iraq was prioritized over the independence of Iraqi Kurdistan. 610
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Although the KRG’s autonomy was specified in the constitution and Iraqi Prime
Minister Haider al-Abadi did “acknowledge independence as the natural right of Kurds” in
April 2017, he still demanded the referendum be cancelled and even threatened to deploy
Iraqi troops.611 And it was not an empty threat. One month after the referendum, the Iraqi
government, with support from Iran and Turkey, sent in troops to invade Iraqi Kurdistan,
which cost the KRG one-fifth of its territory, including Kirkuk and the oil fields in the
region.612 Facing the rising tension between the Iraqi government and the Kurds, Turkey
chose to back the Iraqi government, despite its improved relationship and economic
cooperation with the KRG in the past few years.613 The Turkish Foreign Ministry called the
referendum “a grave mistake” in June, and Erdogan even sent Turkish Foreign Minister to
persuade Barzani “not to make this mistake.” 614 Turkey’s mediation, however, was rejected
by Barzani, which angered Erdogan, since the KRG’s rejection undermined his image as an
influential leader in the region. 615 Moreover, Turkey found the KRG’s inclusion of Kirkuk in
the referendum unacceptable. 616 The KRG saw Kirkuk as the Kurdish “Jerusalem” while
Erdogan perceived it as “a Turkmen city” and described the KRG’s control over the city as
“an act of occupation” that deliberately provoked Turkish sensitivities. 617 On the day of the
referendum, Erdogan dismissed the result of the referendum as “null, void and illegitimate,”
launched a military exercise along the border, and then closed airspace to the KRG.618 As for
Iran, it banned all air traffic from Iran to Iraqi Kurdistan the day before the referendum, upon
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the request of the Iraqi government, which is currently in Shi'a Arabs’ control. 619 In sum,
both Turkey and Iran were concerned about a change of status quo in Iraq, which could
produce crises along their borders.620 Their tough attitude and strong response could also be
intended to deter the PYD in Syria and their own Kurdish population. 621
Apparently, the Iraqi Kurds tried to use this referendum to leverage their newly acquired
international reputation to attract more attention and support. 622 This attempt already created
conflict and built up tension in the region. 623 If the KRG continues to use its increased power
to pursue independence, sectarian tensions will continue to grow in the Middle East, which
could lead to fighting and instability in Iraq. 624 Additionally, the U.S. will have to deal with
Turkey’s growing grievances.625 Even though Trump dispatched a Special Presidential Envoy
to offer Barzani a way out and reiterated the U.S. rejection of the referendum during his
meeting with Erdogan in September 2017, Turkey was not satisfied. 626 The referendum rekindled Ankara’s long-standing suspicion since the First Gulf War in 1991 that the U.S.
intends to build an independent Kurdish state along Turkey’s border, which would eventually
stretch to include the Turkish southeastern provinces.627 Ironically, the KRG, the
destabilizing factor in this intense dynamic among Iraq, Turkey, and the U.S., was a product
of the first Gulf War. 628 It came to power through cooperating with the U.S. during the
invasion of Iraq in 2003 and became more powerful due to U.S. support to fight ISIS. 629 As
shown by the U.S. reaction to the KRG referendum, the U.S. does not support the
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independence of the Kurds in Iraq. 630 In other words, the U.S. own creation, strengthened by
U.S. support, is now pursuing objectives against the U.S. interests.
Similar to the case in Iraq, the PYD-headed Democratic Federation of Northern Syria
(DFNS)’s ambition to acquire autonomy in Syria and the PYD’s attempts to trade territories
with the Russian- and Iran-backed Assad regime would both jeopardize U.S. interests. 631 The
DFNS was established in March 2016, and was previously known as the Cantons of
Rojava.632 The DFNS is currently in charge of the Kurd-controlled cantons in Syria and
hopes to achieve not only autonomy for the Kurds but also pluralist democratic rule in Syria,
where “the rights of all the ethnic and religious minorities” will be recognized. 633 This vision
already faced pushback in Tell Abyad, Manbij, and al-Raqqa.634 The population in these areas
refused to recognize the Kurdish government, saw it as serving the interests of the Kurds, and
set up civilian councils to take over administration and governance. 635 In addition to domestic
obstacles, Turkey also had no stomach for another autonomous Kurdistan on its border. 636
According to Barkey, Turkey was worried about the U.S. granting the Syrian Kurds rights for
self-governance, which would give rise to “a second KRG.”637 Having two self-governed
Kurdistans on its border is not acceptable for Turkey, not to mention that one of them is
affiliated with the PKK.638 In order to prevent the DFNS from establishing “a terror state,”
Turkey has been willing and ready to deploy the military. 639 Turkey already attacked the
Syrian Kurds on several occasions during the war. 640 For instance, Turkey air bombed the
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YPG in April 2016 and, in November, supported the FSA to prevent the SDF from taking alBab, a city that would connect the Afrin canton with the Kobani canton. 641 These attacks
showed Turkey’s resolve to invade, which could give rise to fighting among the PYD, Turkey,
and possibly intervention from Iran and Russia. 642 Such a conflict, involving “an armed
revolutionary nationalist movement” attached to the terrorist group PKK, a U.S. ally ready
and capable of “wiping out a credible threat to its territorial integrity,” and two foreign
powers aiming at greater influence in the Middle East, is not in the U.S. interests. 643 Besides,
chaos or another power vacuum could easily lead to the re-emergence of ISIS, which was just
rooted out in the region.
Prior to the U.S. withdrawal, the Syrian Kurds relied on the U.S. presence to deter a
Turkish invasion.644 Trump’s abrupt decision to withdraw in December 2018 made the Kurds
feel betrayed and abandoned. 645 In response, the PYD immediately turned to Russia and
Assad for protection. 646 Though a negotiation between the Kurds and Assad is expected, a
deal constructed while the Kurds have unprecedented control of territories and resources, yet
no international or regional support, would not align well with U.S. strategic interests. 647 If
the Syrian Kurds continue to allow the regime troops to enter Kurd-controlled territory, as
they did in December 2018 when they invited Syrian armies to enter Manbij, it would not
only make Assad’s goal to recover all lost land in Syria much easier to achieve, but also
significantly benefit both Russia and Iran. 648 Russia saw the oil fields in northern Syria as
valuable assets that would help Assad’s reconstruction, while Iran wanted to create a path
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that would “connect forces it supports in Syria and Lebanon with those in Iraq.” 649 During a
meeting with the Kurds in February 2019, the Assad regime refused to grant the Syrian Kurds
autonomy.650 Despite Assad’s refusal, northern Syria is currently under PYD self-rule and the
large amount of territory gives the Kurds leverage to negotiate. The result of such a
negotiation, however, may not necessarily be in the U.S. interests.
As demonstrated above, the Iraqi Kurds’ ambition for independence and the Syrian
Kurds’ goal of autonomy both contradict the U.S. objectives. In other words, the U.S. was
pursuing a somewhat self-contradictory policy: the U.S. wanted the Kurds to be strong so that
they could defeat ISIS, but the U.S. did not want them to be so strong that they could fight for
independence. The KRG’s referendum and the PYD’s negotiations with Assad both show
that the Kurds are wielding their growing power to pursue their own objectives at the expense
of U.S. interests. What is more interesting is the proposal made by U.S. commanders, who
suggested that the Kurds should be allowed to keep U.S.-supplied weapons.651 Such a
proposal was motivated by two factors. First, since Trump’s decision to withdraw was
criticized as stabbing the Kurds in the back, letting the YPG fighters keep the weapons could
serve as a reassurance that they were not abandoned.652 Second, it would be nearly impossible
for the U.S. to locate and recover all the weapons anyway. 653 There were few strings attached
when the arms were delivered to the Kurds.654 After sending the weapons to the Peshmerga,
the U.S.-led coalition did not track the end-use or follow up on the distribution of the
weapons, in fear of interfering with the KRG’s sovereignty. 655 Whether the Kurds will be
allowed to keep the weapons remains an undecided issue. If Trump adopts the Pentagon’s
649
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proposal, the YPG will have a variety of advanced U.S. weapons, including “anti-tank
missiles, armored vehicles and mortars,” that can be used to forward an agenda at odds with
U.S. interests.656
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
To sum up, despite significant power disadvantages, local forces can not only break free
from external powers’ control but also effectively manipulate external support to pursue their
own objectives because they have practical advantages, a stronger will to fight, and diverging
objectives from the external power. In terms of practical advantage, local forces have a more
extensive local presence and networks, better knowledge about the local power dynamic, and
greater legitimacy in the local sphere. These characteristics make local forces desirable
partners during intervention, which consequently, gives them leverage over external powers.
Second, local forces have a much stronger will to fight than external powers because they
have higher stakes involved in the conflict. The fact that local forces have troops on the
ground, more than likely fighting for survival, justifies the deployment of all their resources
and personnel. The external powers, however, are insulated from the fighting, since their
security and survival are not under threat. Given the absence of an imminent threat and the
overwhelming power advantage, the constituents or elites of the external power, depending
on the regime type, will demand a quick victory to justify the necessity and benefits of the
intervention. Such a demand, a political vulnerability, can constrain the external power’s will,
which could serve as a signal for the local forces that the patronage relationship will not be
long-term. If local forces perceive the relationship and support as short-term, they will not
worry much about the repercussions of sabotaging the relationship and will be more likely to
manipulate the support to pursue their own objectives, if given the chance. Third, the
relationship between external powers and local forces suffers from the problem of agency
slack, which tends to be more serious when the objectives of the two actors severely misalign.
The misalignment of objectives would then create incentives for the local forces to
manipulate external support to pursue their own objectives, which could be against the
interests of their patrons.
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The three factors identified above are then applied and examined in two cases. First,
Cuba effectively manipulated support from the Soviet Union during the intervention in the
Angolan civil war in 1975. Cuba, as “a self-motivated international paladin,” acted within the
parameters of the Soviet strategic interests, while at the same time pursuing its own
objectives, which did not necessarily align with the Soviet objectives in Africa. Its long-term
military presence in Africa before the civil war and its identity as a Third World state enabled
Cuba to build special ties with African countries. Compared to the Soviet Union, a
superpower during the Cold War, Cuba’s presence in Angola was more welcoming and
enjoyed higher legitimacy. Moreover, after the outbreak of the civil war, Cuba deployed
military advisers and troops to fight alongside the MPLA, through which Cuba exerted great
influence on the MPLA’s military strategies and policies. In sum, Cuba’s long-standing
military presence in the region, legitimacy among African countries, and deployment of
military personnel to support the MPLA all contributed to its practical advantages over the
Soviet Union. In terms of relative will, Cuba, though not a local force facing an existential
threat, still had stronger will to fight due to its military presence on the ground. For the Soviet
Union, southern Africa was not a high priority; the Soviet strategic interests in Africa focused
on northern Africa and the Horn of Africa. Additionally, Soviet will was constrained by the
fact that the Soviets were concerned about the intervention disrupting détente and again
leading to high tensions in the relationship with the U.S. The Soviets’ limited interests in
Angola and southern Africa, however, could lead to an unfavorable situation for Cuba.
Cuba’s leverage and value would diminish; the Soviet support would decrease; and Cuba’s
revolutionary mission in Africa would be hard to sustain. Consequently, Cuba had a strong
incentive to escape Soviet control and to effectively use the Soviet support to win battles in
Angola, through which the Soviet Union could appreciate Cuba’s value and be more willing
to invest in interventions in the region. More interventions in Africa would then lead to a
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closer alliance between the Soviet Union and Cuba, which meant that Cuba could continue to
benefit from Soviet support to pursue its own objectives in the region. Evidence shows that
Cuba not only broke free from the Soviet dominance – Cuba forced fait accompli upon the
Soviets in several occasions during the intervention – but also manipulated Soviet support to
forward its own interests. Cuba obtained more military and economic support from the Soviet
Union, enjoyed greater autonomy in its alliance with the Soviets, achieved higher status in the
Third World, and actively influenced the Soviet Union’s Africa policies.
Interestingly, in another external power-local force patronage relationship in the
Angolan civil war – the relationship between the U.S. and South Africa – South
Africa, which was the local force in this case because it deployed troops to support the FNLA
in Angola, failed to manipulate the U.S. support to forward its own interests. The U.S.
encouraged and supported South Africa’s decision to invade Angola to support the FNLA in
fighting the Soviet and Cuba-backed MPLA.657 After the U.S. involvement in this widely
condemned invasion was made public, the U.S. immediately ended “any de facto alliance
with South Africa” and stopped providing aid to Angola. 658 In fear of Angola turning into a
second Vietnam, then-US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger claimed that the U.S. did not
collude with South Africa. 659 This claim, however, was refuted by the South Africans, who
argued that the U.S. assured African countries that their efforts to fight against Soviet-backed
forces in Angola would receive continuous U.S. support. 660 With the U.S. clearly distancing
itself, South Africa was forced to bear the military and political costs of defeats against Cuba
in Angola.661 Facing both domestic opposition and international condemnation, South Africa
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could do nothing more than blame the U.S. for abandoning it as an instrument. 662 In this case,
the weaker partner, South Africa, had no opportunity to manipulate the U.S. and, in fact, it
could be argued that it was itself manipulated.
The second case is about the U.S. supporting the Syrian and Iraqi Kurds to fight ISIS in
Syria and Iraq during the Syrian civil war. The U.S. directly intervened in Syria in September
2014 through an aerial campaign to fight ISIS. However, in order to defeat ISIS, an aerial
campaign was not enough. The U.S. needed ground troops, preferably local forces, for both
practical and political reasons. Practically, ground troops were essential to hold territories
recovered from ISIS, to gather human intelligence, to better understand the local power
dynamic, and more importantly, to serve as an alternative to ISIS to provide authority for the
local population. Among multiple local forces engaged in the civil war, the U.S. chose to
back the Syrian and Iraqi Kurds because they are more homogenous, well-organized, and
militarily capable. Moreover, the Kurds’ identity as a minority group facing an existential
threat, as a result of ISIS’s attack, made the narrative of supporting the Kurds acceptable and
popular among the western governments and public. The U.S. long-standing relationship with
the KRG also made the Kurds relatively trustworthy. As a result, the U.S. started supporting
the Kurds, who turned out to be very effective in fighting ISIS. With the U.S. support, Kurds
defeated ISIS and kept the reclaimed territories, through which the Kurds’ territorial holdings
significantly increased. In comparison, the Kurds had a stronger will to fight than the U.S. did
in Syria. Both the Syrian and the Iraqi Kurds faced an existential threat before the U.S.
intervention, which made it easy to justify the deployment of all of their resources and
personnel. The U.S., however, was not challenged by any imminent threat. Its will was
further constrained by public opinion – mostly against another intervention in the Middle
East – and the U.S. alliance with Turkey. Turkey strongly opposed U.S. support for the
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Syrian Kurds, whom the Turks saw as affiliated with the PKK, the terrorist group that has
been trying to gain independence and divide Turkey since the 1980s. Protest and pressure
from Turkey forced the U.S. to maintain a delicate balance between supporting the Syrian
Kurds – the only meaningful ally on the ground in fighting ISIS – and Turkey, an important
NATO ally. The U.S. conceded to Turkey’s pressure and stopped arms supplies for the
Syrian Kurds after the Kurds defeated ISIS in al-Raqqa, ISIS’s capital in Syria. This served
as a signal for the Syrian Kurds that the U.S. was not willing to make a long-term
commitment, which therefore motivated the Kurds to sabotage the relationship and
manipulate the short-term support to achieve their own objectives. Unlike the U.S.’s
constantly fluctuating objectives in the Middle East, Kurds have a clear set of objectives: to
acquire independence or autonomy. Through the alliance with the U.S. while fighting ISIS,
Kurds acquired an unprecedented amount of power and territory, which could significantly
strengthen their potential to gain independence. Neither an independent Kurdistan, or the
Kurds wielding their newly acquired power in the Middle East, however, are in the U.S.
interests, however, because they can create instability in the region, especially in Iraq and
Syria. Despite strong opposition from the U.S. and Turkey, the KRG held a referendum in
September 2017, which could be seen as an attempt to leverage its newly acquired power and
international legitimacy to gain more external support before the U.S. withdrawal from Syria.
However, when the threat of an independent Kurdistan became real, the U.S. and the regional
powers, especially Turkey and Iran, prioritized the territorial integrity of Iraq over the
independence of the Kurds. In response to the referendum, Iraq invaded the Iraqi Kurds,
Turkey started border patrol, and Iran closed airspace to the KRG. Apparently, tension had
already been building up in Iraq as Kurds acquired more power. The Syrian Kurds, on the
other hand, wanted to achieve autonomy in a federal Syria, which is not acceptable for the
Assad regime or Turkey. Assad has always wanted to reclaim all the territories in Syria and
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already refused the Kurds’ request for autonomy. As for Turkey, with the autonomous Iraqi
Kurdistan already on its border, Turkey could not tolerate another one in Syria, not to
mention the PYD’s affiliation to the PKK. Turkey attacked the Syrian Kurds several times
while the U.S. was still supporting the Kurds in fighting ISIS. After the U.S. withdrawal,
Turkey’s threat to invade the Syrian Kurds becomes more imminent. If Turkey decides to
invade, it would be another bloody war that would once again give rise to chaos and a power
vacuum in Syria, which could easily lead to ISIS’s resurgence in the region. The Syrian
Kurds already started negotiating with the Assad regime to exchange territory for protection
against Turkey. Given Russia and Iran’s support for the Assad regime, it would be hard to
imagine that they would settle on an agreement that is not in their best interests. An
expansion of Russian and/or Iranian influence in the Middle East, however, is not in U.S.
interests. Apparently, the Kurds are using the power, acquired while fighting ISIS, to pursue
their own objectives in the Middle East, which has already led to instability in the region.
What’s more interesting is the proposals made by the Pentagon to let the Kurds keep U.S.supplied weapons, which means the Kurds could walk away with U.S. support to continue
engaging in activities that would jeopardize U.S. interests.
Among the three factors that enable local forces to manipulate external powers’ support,
diverging objectives is the most important. While practical advantage gives local forces
leverage and makes them useful partners for external powers, and stronger will gives local
forces another advantage to close the significant power gap, it is diverging objectives that
provides local forces with motivations and incentives to exploit and manipulate the support.
If the objectives of these two actors perfectly align, such an exploitation and manipulation
will not happen.
In general, the three factors – practical advantage, relative will, and diverging objectives
– apply well in explaining the dynamic between the Soviet Union and Cuba in Angola, and

95

the relationship between the U.S. and the Kurds while fighting ISIS. However, two cases are
not sufficient to generalize about the power dynamic in all proxy relationships. As briefly
mentioned above, South Africa was merely an instrument of the U.S. while intervening in
Angola. Consequently, further research and discussion are necessary to explore under what
conditions manipulation would be more likely to happen and be successful.
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